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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bills and Notes-Release Clauses in Stop Payment Orders
A depositor wanted to stop payment on a check drawn by him and
not yet presented to the drawee bank for payment. He signed a "Re-
quest to Stop Payment" on a printed form given him by the bank's
clerk. The "request" contained the following release under seal: "Should
the check be paid through inadvertence, accident, or oversight, it is
expressly agreed that the bank will in no way be held responsible. The
bank receives this request upon the express condition that it shall not
be in any way liable for its act should the check be paid by it in the
course of its business. The undersigned agrees to be legally bound
hereby." Three days later the check was paid by the drawee bank
"through inadvertence, accident, or oversight" and charged against the
drawer's account. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing a Su-
perior Court decision,' held the release clause void as against public
policy.2
The effectiveness or validity of release clauses has been decided so
far in eight states and in one federal district court.8 Until the recent
Pennsylvania decision, the majority of jurisdictions had held such
clauses to be enforceable. 4 It is, of course, well established that "at
common law a bank is liable to the drawer of a check for payment after
receipt of a proper non-payment notice." 5 The two points on which the
courts are obliged to examine such clauses have been (1) the considera-
tion question and (2) the public policy question.
As to the first, some courts have held that the consideration to the
bank for the express agreement not to pay the check grows out of the
"mercantile relation of the parties and the reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions which the law attaches to that relation." 6 The common law liability
'Thomas v. First National Bank of Scranton, 173 Pa. Super. 205, 96 A. 2d 196
(1953).
'Thomas v. First National Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A. 2d 910 (1954).
'California, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Federal District Court of Puerto Rico.
'New York, Massachusetts, Indiana, Federal District Court of Puerto Rico, and
Pennsylvania had held such release clauses enforceable. The principal case re-
versed a decision in 173 Pa. Super. 205, 96 A. 2d 196 (1953). This case had itself
overruled two decisions of the Pennsylvania District and County Court, Michaels
v. First National Bank of Scranton, 73 Pa. D. & C. 557 (1951); and Adams v.
Homewood Bank at Pittsburgh, 76 Pa. D. & C. 557 (1951). The principal case
also distinguished an early Pennsylvania case, Cohen v. State Bank of Philadelphia,
69 Pa. Super. 40 (1917), holding such agreements enforceable.
' Stearne, J. in Thomas v. First National Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, 184,
101 A. 2d 910, 911 (1954).
' Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 401, 126 N. E. 782, 784 (1920).
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of the bank may be limited provided the limitation has the consent of the
depositor.7 This result is based on the theory that freedom of contract
must be upheld. On the other hand, it has been found by other courts
that while the reciprocal rights and obligations inherent in the depositor-
bank relation are sufficient to supply consideration for the bank's liability
to stop payment, the release agreement is something new and requires
additional consideration moving from the bank to the depositor. Absent
such additional consideration the bank receives benefit but suffers no
detriment.8 To the argument that the consideration for the depositor's
release was the bank's not cancelling his account but allowing him to
continue as a depositor with the bank, it has been answered that such
consideration was not bargained for in exchange for the release agree-
ment and therefore could not constitute a valid consideration. 9 It has
been suggested that promissory estoppel might supply the missing ele-
ment of bargaining.'0 The importance of consideration as a question
for the court has, however, declined in recent years due to the rise of the
public policy question.
As to the question of public policy, the courts favoring the validity
of such clauses take the attitude that "inadvertence" includes negligence"
and is intended to exonerate the bank from the negligence of its em-
ployees, and further hold that this -exoneration is not against public
policy.12 The rationale is that, before it can be said that public policy
has been contravened, it must be shown that the contract has a tendency
to injure the public, is against public good, or is inconsistent with sound
' Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929). The court went
further to say that a stop payment order, if it is not wished that the bank's liability
be limited, should be positive and unqualified. A Bank not wishing to assume such
liability may cancel the depositor's account and thus cancel the relationship. See
Chase National Bank of New York v. Battat et al., 297 N. Y. 185, 190, 78 N. E. 2d
465, 467 (1948).
8 Speroff v. First Century Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N. E. 2d 119 (1948).
The court held (1) that an oral order to stop payment was sufficient and (2) that
a subsequent written agreement containing the release clause was without con-
sideration. There is an excellent annotation in 1 A. L. R. 2d 1155 (1948).
' Calamita v. Tradesman's National Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. 2d 46 (1949);.
Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton National Bank and Trust Co., 16 N. J. Super. 430,
84 A. 2d 741 (1951), aff'd ne~n., 9 N. J. 607, 89 A. 2d 242 (1952) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 75(1) (1932). However, had there been a recital that the continuance
of the relation was bargained for as consideration, the clause would have been
enforceable as far as the consideration is concerned, and the courts might have
been forced into the public pplicy field. Such was the situation in the principal
case.
1025 N. Y. U. L. REv., 419, 421 (1950) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932);
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 139 (rev. ed. 1936).
"' South Carolina, in Carroll v. South Carolina Nat. Bank, 211 S. C. 406, 45
S. E. 2d 729 (1947) held that the burden of proof was on the bank to show in-
advertence or oversight in payment. In Martinez v. National City Bank of N. Y.,
80 F. Supp. 545 (D. Puerto Rico 1948) (the only federal case concerning release
-agreements in stop payment orders) it was held that the bank is not liable for
negligent payment under such an agreement as long as there is no wilful disregard
of the order.
"Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N. E. 782 (1920).
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policy and good morals, either as to consideration or as to things to be
done or not done. Further, goes the reasoning, it is actually to the best
interest of the public that there be freedom of contract. Therefore such
agreements should not be held void as against public policy unless they
contravene what the legislature or judiciary has clearly established as
public policy.' 3
In two states the public policy question is a cut and dried matter.
California and Pennsylvania have declared by statute that such agree-
ments are not enforceable.' 4 But where there is no statute, the courts
have not been backward about making themselves the source of public
policy based on well recognized common law principles. For example,
in Ohio the supreme court held that a contract to relieve a bank of
liability on account of inadvertence or oversight was against public policy
and did not relieve the bank of its duty to act in good faith and exercise
reasonable care.'5 The New Jersey court did not have to decide the
public policy question since it found a lack of consideration; however,
the court suggested that banks be treated in the same way as quasi-
public enterprises such as utilities, common carriers and the like, which
are deprived of power to enforce release clauses of the type here in-
volved.' 6 This was the theory on which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court declared the release in the principal case to be against public
policy. Since the consideration question was answered by the Uniform
Written Obligations Act 7 and further by the release being under seal,
'the court likened banks to common carriers and public utilities, reason-
ing that all banks are subject to rigid state and federal controls and that
every person must use such controlled banks if they are to use a bank
at all. Since in Pennsylvania it is against public policy to allow a com-
mon carrier to limit its liability,' 8 the court held it also against public
" Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N. E. 488 (1932).
"California was the first to have such a statute, CALIF. CIv. CoDE § 1668
(Deering, 1949) : "Certain contracts unlawful. All contracts which have for their
object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of the
law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law." Such release
agreements were held to be in violation of this statute in Hiroshima v. Bank of
Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947 (1926); Grisinger v. Golden State Bank, 92
Cal. App. 433, 268 P. 425 (1928). The Pennsylvania Statute, a part of the Uniform
Commercial Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A § 4-103(1) (Purdon, 1954), was put
into effect on 1 July 1954, too late to be applied by the court in the principal case.
It reads as follows: "The effect of the provisions of this article may be varied by
agreement, except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility to limit
the measure of damages for its own* lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordi-
nary care."
1" Speroff v. First Century Trust Co., 194 Ohio St. 415, 79 N. E. 2d 119 (1948).
" Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton National Bank and Trust Co., 16 N. J. Super.
430, 84 A. 2d 741 (1951), aff'd inent., 9 N. J. 607, 89 A. 2d 242 (1952).
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 6 (Purdon, 1949) (the words "The undersigned
agrees to be legally bound hereby." eliminate the necessity 'for consideration.).
18 Turek v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 361 Pa. 512, 64 A. 2d 779 (1949) ; Cole-
man v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 242 Pa. 304, 89 Atl. 87 (1913).
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policy to allow a bank to do so. While these two areas are not completely
analogous, since banks are not required to accept all persons who apply
for their services as are utilities and common carriers, still there is
enough similarity to enable the Pennsylvania court to reach its desired
result.
Another point to consider is that although, theoretically, the bank
and depositor have equal bargaining power, in actuality they do not.
The depositor, not being so well versed in his rights as the bank, is
usually made to feel that the bank is doing him a favor and thinks that
he is obligated to sign whatever release he is given.' 9 Also the bank
has the deeper pocket, is better protected by insurance, and is therefore
better able to absorb the loss. 20 Then too, the loss may be distributed
through service charges on stop payment notices.21 These are not legal
considerations, but they are some of the things which go into making up
public policy.
No North Carolina decision has yet passed on the validity of release
clauses or agreements in stop payment orders.- However, in Miller's
Mutual Fire Insurance A.is'n v. Parker22 the court has held that a
parking lot owner, "a professional bailee," could not, by giving notice
orally, on signs or printed on the claim check, relieve himself of liability
for loss by fire or theft of the cars placed under his care. And from the
common carrier angle, the court recently held in Crowell v. Eastern Air
Lines23 that an airline could not limit its liability for accidents by an
agreement on the ticket requiring, as a prerequisite to action .predicated
thereon, that all accident claims be filed within ninety days, since such
a limitation is void as against public policy. In view of these two cases
it does not seem that the North Carolina Supreme Court would look
with much favor on a release agreement in a stop payment order.
Only time and litigation can tell what the courts will do in the future
with respect to such release agreements. However, with the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code24 by more and more states, it would seem
that release agreements are doomed to be held against public policy even
more frequently in the future than they have been in the past.
PAUL B. GUTHERY, JR.
10 See Note, 29 CoT. L. REv. 1150 (1929).
20 See Comment, 25 TEMp. L. Q. 486 (1952).
2 See Note, 27 N. Y. U. L. REV. 345, 348 (1952).
22234 N. C. 20, 65 S. E. 2d 341 (1951).
2 240 N. C. 20, 81 S. E. 2d 178 (1954).
2
' Supra note 14.
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Constitutional Law-Due Process-Use of Illegally Obtained
Evidence in State Courts
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... 1
Fresh in the minds of the framers of the Fourth Amendment was the
bitter controversy over issuance of "writs of assistance" in the colonies,
prior to the American Revolutionary War. Promulgated by England,
in an effort to restrain colonial trading with her enemieg, these writs
were general search warrants, bearing no particularized description of
places, persons, or things to be searched or seized. Expressions of
opposition to the writs perhaps achieved maximal intensity when James
Otis declared that the writs were "'the worst instrument of arbitrary
power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental prin-
ciples of law, that ever was found in an English law book;' since they
placed the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."
'2
Almost two hundred years later, an incident occurred which could
revive echoes of the impassioned sentiments of James Otis. Municipal
police officers, suspecting that one Irvine was engaged in illegal horse-
race bookmaking and related offenses, procured a locksmith to fashion
a key that would fit the front door of Irvine's house, and used that key
to gain entrance into Irvine's home while he and his wife were away.
The officers then concealed a microphone in the hallway, bored a hole in
the roof of the house, and strung connecting wires through the hole from
the microphone to a listening post in a nearby garage. Officers were
stationed in relays at the listening post for approximately thirty days.
Twice during that time they re-entered the home to relocate the micro-
phone, first into the bedroom of Irvine and his wife, and then into the
bedroom closet. After obtaining evidence to their satisfaction, the offi-
cers, using the same key, re-entered Irvine's home and arrested him.
During the arrest the officers made a search of the house, for which
no warrant had been issued. Irvine's conviction for violating anti-
U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. IV.
"Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 625 (1886). "This was in February,
1761, in Boston, and the famous debate in which it occurred was perhaps the most
prominent event -which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions
of the mother country. 'Then and there,' said John Adams, 'then and there was
the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.
Then and there the child Independence was born.'" Ibid.
For more detailed historical discussions of the search and seizure clause, see:
Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 19 ILL. L. REv. 303(1925), in which it is stated, at p. 307: "Thus viewed historically the purpose of
the search and seizure clause was to restrain the legalization of unreasonable
searches and seizures ;" and Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seimres, 34 HAXv.
L. REv. 361 (1921).
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gambling laws8 was affirmed on appeal in California,4 ,and again in the
United States Supreme Court by a divided Court.5
The petitioner, Irvine, argued on appeal that the police officers' testi-
mony admitted during the trial should have been excluded, on the basis
that it was obtained by methods which violated the -Fourteenth Amend-
ment.6 The Court held, however, that in a state prosecution for a state
crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid admission of evidence
so obtained.7
The manner in which the Court reached this holding does not, by its
own choice, follow a logical sequence of reasoning. The Court admitted
that "'security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police'
is embodied in the concept of due process as found in the Fourteenth
Amendment."" This is saying, in effect, that the protection of the Fourth
Amendment (the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures) is embodied in the concept of due process as found in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Though the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment are not directly applicable to the states,9 the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment are.10 In federal courts, evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded." Therefore, it would
seem to follow that such evidence should also be excluded in state courts.
The major premise and the minor premise are both present in the Court's
reasoning, but it refuses to be bound by this strictly logical conclusion.
Thus, the primary question posed by the Irvine case is: Why will
the Supreme Court not apply to the states a rule of evidence similar to
that applied in the federal courts?
The Court has answered this question in Wolf v. Colorado'2 and
'CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 337a (1), (2), (3) and (4) (Deering, 1949).
"People v. Irvine, 113 Cal. App. 2d 460, 248 P. 2d 502 (1952).
Irvine v. California, 72 Sup. Ct. 381 (1954). A 5-4 decision, Justice Jackson
wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Warren and Justices Minton
and Reed joined; Justice Clark wrote a concurring opinion; and, Justices Black,
Douglas, and Frankfurter wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Burton joined in
Justice Frankfurter's dissent; and Justice Douglas concurred with Justice Black's
dissent.
' "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U. S.
CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
' For its holding in the Irvine case, the Court quoted verbatim the holding in
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949) : "We hold, therefore, that in a prosecution
in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the
admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Id. at 33.
The principle of the Wolf case was restated also in Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S.
117 (1951). See also Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199 (1952).
. Irvine v. California, 74 Sup.-Ct. 381, 383 (1954).
' Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).1 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV.
I Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). 1338 U. S. 25 (1949).
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again in the Irvine case. It is not denied that the right to be secure in
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by police is a right to be pro-
tected.1 3  This right is embodied in the Fourth Amendment and in the
Due Process Clause.1 4  However, in determining means of protecting
the right, it becomes evident that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
is only one of several means, 15 and even though the Supreme Court has
enforced this evidentiary rule in the federal courts, it is unwilling to
condemn as falling below minimal standards of "due process of law"
states' reliance on other means to protect the right.10 For these reasons,
therefore, the Court, in interpreting its role in supervising administration
of criminal justice in state courts, has concluded that "due process of
law" does not command the Court or the states to exclude illegally ob-
tained evidence in state prosecutions for state crimes.
Four factors which have influenced the Court in this determination
are: (1) the questionable validity of the evidentiary rule of exclusion;
(2) the reluctance of states to adopt similar rules of evidence; (3) the
questionable effectiveness of the rule as a deterrent against illegal
searches and seizures; and (4) the historical interpretation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Each of these factors
will be discussed.
The questionable validity of the evidentiary rule of exclusion. Origi-
nating in Boyd v. United StatesT and Weeks v. United States, 8 the
"Id. at 27. Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct. 381, 383 (1954).
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
15 For example, the victim of an illegal search may have an action for dam-
ages in tort against the searching officer, the state may dismiss the offending officer
or prosecute him in a criminal proceeding, and the federal government may prose-
cute the offending officer under Civil Rights Sections of the U. S. Criminal Code.
In this respect, see: Appendix to Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct. 381 (1954);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 30-32, note 1 (1949) ; 18 U. S. C. §§ 241 and 242(1952).
16 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 31 (1949).
' 116 U. S. 616 (1886). The rule had its inception in this case, wherein the
Court declared that compulsory production of private hooks and papers is "com-
pelling [the accused] to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure-
and an unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id. at 634-635. The Court held therefore that the admission of the evi-
dence was unconstitutional. Id. at 638.
Thus, the Boyd case upset the long established common law principle previously
followed by the Supreme Court, that the "admissibility of evidence is not affected
by the illegality of the means through which the party has been enabled to obtain
the evidence." VIII WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2183, p. 5 (3d ed. 1940).
For discussions of the Boyd case, see: VIII WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2184 (3d ed.
1940) ; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HAI1v. L. REV. 361 (1921) ;
Ramsey, Acquisiton of Evidence by Search and Seizure, 47 MicH. L. REV. 1137
(1949).
18 232 U. S. 383 (1914). Though first stated in the Boyd case, the rule did not
become finalized until the Weeks decision, for in 1904, eighteen years after the Boyd
case, the Supreme Court returned to the old rule, when it held in Adams v. New
York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904), that private papers were not rendered inadmissible
though seized illegally. Ten years later, the Weeks case reaffirmed the doctrine
stated in Boyd, by holding that, in a federal prosecution, where federal officers
[Vol. 33
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federal rule briefly stated is: In a federal prosecution, the Fourth Amend-
ment bars admission of evidence obtained through illegal search and
seizure.19
Authorities have criticized this rule since its inception as being in
direct conflict with a long established rule that "the admissibility of evi-
dence is not affected by the illegality of the means through which the
party has been enabled to obtain the evidence." 20 It is said that rather
than exclude the evidence, other legal remedies should be sought for
correction of illegal methods employed by police, since the question of
the means by which the evidence was obtained is a collateral issue, having
no bearing on the immediate question of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.21
The rule has also been criticized on constitutional grounds, the main
argument being that since the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly
prohibit admission of evidence obtained in its violation, there is no justi-
fication in the argument that the rule is a mandate by implication. 22
Many modifications of the rule have developed,23 and though the
Supreme Court has never expressly embraced opinions of critics, it has
applied the rule with care and divided opinion.24
have obtained private documents by illegal search and seizure, it is a violation of
the constitutional rights of the defendant not to grant his pre-trial petition for
return of the documents, and that to permit their being held and later admitted as
evidence in the trial is prejudicial error.
For a criticism- of the Weeks case, see VIII WIGMoRE, EvIDENCE, § 2184 (3d ed.
194, Fior discussions of the federal evidentiary rule of exclusion, see: VIII Wic-
moiRE, EvDE-TCE, §§ 2184 and 2184a (3d ed. 1940) ; Grant, Constitutional Basis of
the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seized Evidence, 15 So. CALiF. L. Rav. 60(1941); Note, 50 COL. L. Rav. 364 (1950); Comment, 42 MIcH. L. Rav. 679
(1944); Comment, 36 YALE L. J. 536 (1927).
" VIII WIGueoE, EviDENcE, § 2183, p. 5 (3d ed. 1940).21 VIII id. § 2184 at p. 35.
a VIII id. at 35-40.
29 The rule applies only to federal officers, and a federal prosecutor may make
use of evidence seized illegally by a private detective, Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U. S. 465 (1921), and by state officers. Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487(1944) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). Lower federal courts have
held that one objecting to the evidence must have a proprietary or possessory in-
terest in the seized articles, Steeber v. United States, 198 F. 2d 615, 617 (10th
Cir. 1952) ; Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F. 2d 629 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; and the Su-
preme Court has gone as far as to exclude contraband evidence. United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 (1951) ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925). In
addition, the pre-trial petition or motion for return of the seized articles, an at-
tached condition in the Weeks holding, is no longer required in order for evidence
to be excluded. Ibid.; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921). Corporations
cannot be compelled to produce originals of corporate records when an indictment
is framed from copies of the original records made illegally by federal officers,
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920); however, a
corporation can be compelled to produce for examination records whose mainte-
nance is required by federal law. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S.
186 (1946). In noting these modifications, no attempt was made to be exhaustive.
For a complete collection of state and federal cases, see VIII WGmORE, EvDmEcE,
§§2183 and 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
", For an analysis of search and seizure cases involving application of the federal
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Reluctance of states to adopt similar rules of evidence. States have
been most reluctant to formulate rules of evidence similar to that pro-
pounded in the Weeks case.2 5  Only one state had formulated a similar
rule prior to the Weeks decision, and that state later repudiated its prior
formulation of the rule. Before the Weeks case had been decided, twenty-
six states had expressly opposed such a rule, and today, approximately
two-thirds of the states still reject it. The influence of this reluctance on
the part of the states is evidenced by the words of Justice Frankfurter, in
the Wolf case: "We cannot brush aside the experience of States which
deem the incidence of such conduct by the police too slight to call for a
deterrent remedy . . . by way of . . overriding the relevant rules of
evidence." 28
The questionable effectiveness of the rule.2 7 There is no way 6f de-
termining whether or not enforcement of the rule acts as a deterrent
against illegal searches and seizures. Surely, many officers conduct
evidentiary rule of exclusion, from 1914 to 1946, see Appendix to Harris v. United
States, 331 U. S. 145 (1946).
Since 1946, the Court has applied the evidentiary rule in these search and seizure
cases: Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948) (seizure of narcotics)
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699 (1948) (seizure of illegal distillery)
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948) (seizure of "numbers game"
paraphernalia) ; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 (1951) (seizure of contra-
band narcotics).
Since 1946, the Court has refused to apply the evidentiary rule in these search
and seizure cases: Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327. U. S. 186 (1946)
(corporation compelled to produce for examination records required by federal
law to be maintained) ; Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (1946) (seizure of
public documents); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949) (search of
automobile) ; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950) (seizure of forged
overprints on cancelled postage stamps) ; On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747
(1952) (use of concealed chest microphone while engaging suspect in incriminating
conversation).
For a discussion of early modifications of the evidentiary rule made by lower
federal courts, see Comment, 36 YALE L. J. 536 (1927).
"3 For a complete analysis of the history of the evidentiary rule of exclusion
among the states, see Appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949). North
Carolina is listed in this Appendix as rejecting the rule. At that time, N. C, GEN.
STAT. § 15-27 (1943) read: "and no facts discovered by reason of the issuance of
such illegal search warrant shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any
action." The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198
S. E. 616 (1938), construed that portion of the statute as meaning that evidence
obtained by illegal search without any warrant was still admissible. Therefore, in
1951, the North Carolina General Assembly added the following provision to the
statute: "Provided, no facts discovered or evidence obtained without a legal search
warrant in the course of any search, made under conditions requiring the issuance
of a search warrant, shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any action."
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953). It seems, therefore, that North Carolina has
statutorily adopted the evidentiary rule of exclusion. For discussion of the new
provision, see: Note, 32 N. C. L. Ray. 114 (1953); Note, 30 N. C. L. REv. 421
(1952) ; A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29 N. C. L.
Rxv. 396 (1951).
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 31-32 (1949).
"' For discussions of this factor influencing the Court, see: Irvine v. California,
74 Sup. Ct. 381, 385-386 (1954); Id. at 393-394 (dissenting opinion); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 41-46 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 33
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investigations without knowledge of the illegality of their methods, and
often, too, the question of illegality is for the courts to decide, for the
law of search and seizure is not static. Posed also by the rule is the
problem of whether or not it is wise to free one lawbreaker because he
has been pursued by another. The complexity of this problem is attested
to by the fact that the federal courts distinguish among the pursuing
lawbreakers, to wit: evidence obtained illegally by private persons28 or
state officers2 9 is admissible, whereas the same evidence is inadmissible
if procured by a federal officer.3 0 This latter practice strikes at the very
core of arguments favoring the rule, for if the rule is really to serve as
a protection of the constitutional right to be secure against illegal searches
and seizures, why should the courts distinguish among persons obtaining
the evidence? Furthermore, the only person protected by the rule is the
lawbreaker, as it is impossible for the rule to reach the situation of the
innocent victim of illegal searches and seizures.
That these and other evidences of the questionable effectiveness of
the rule have influenced the reasoning of the Court is most apparent in
both the Irvine and Wolf decisions, particularly in its condoning states'
reliance on remedies other than an evidentiary rule of exclusion, in their
efforts to protect constitutional rights.
The historical interpretation of the Due Process Clause. Embedded
in the historical interpretation of the Due Process Clause are two basic
propositions: (1) that fundamental to a federal system is the right of
the states to determine the course of procedure to be followed by their
courts in administering justice ;31 and (2) that the Bill of Rights (first
eight Amendments) as such is not applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth'Amendment. 3 2 The states are not absolutely free, but they
"8 See note 23 supra " See note 23 supra. "' See note 23 supra.
"' Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct. 381, 384 (1954) ; Rochin v. California, 342
U. S. 165, 168 (1952) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949) ; Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U. S. 46, 52-53 (1947) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937) ;
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516
(1884); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1877).
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 26 (1949) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U. S.
46 (1947) ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
319 (1937) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) ; Hurtado v. California,
110 U. 8. 516 (1884) ; Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833).
Justice Black is a strong proponent of the argument that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was adopted for the purpose of making the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states. For an extensive outline of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, see his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 68 (1947)
and Appendix thereto, in which he states: "In my judgment that history con-
clusively demonstrates that the language of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, taken as a whole, was thought by those responsible for its submission
to the people, and by those who opposed its submission, sufficiently explicit to
guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and
protections of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 74-75. For other discussions of this
position, see: Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 114 (1908) (dissenting opin-
ion); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 538 (1884) (dissenting opinion)
FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 94 (1908).
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may abridge any privilege or immunity not deemed inherent in national
citizenship. 33 And the Supreme Court has been hesitant in delineating
such privileges and immunities, preserving from state encroachment only
those regarded as the life-blood of liberty and justice-those without
which neither liberty nor justice would exist.8 4 When the Court has
ruled that constitutional rights have been abridged by states in denial
of due process,3 5 it has so ruled not because the rights may have been
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but because the rights have been inter-
preted to be implicit in the concept of "due process of law."8a0
Starting with a proposition that the Due Process Clause exacts from
the states all that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"3 7 the
Court's method of interpreting the clause has been a "gradual process of
inclusion and exclusion,"38 predicated not upon a mechanical standard,
but upon a philosophy of empiricism-judging each case as it is presented
for decision in view of what has preceded it and what can be anticipated
to follow it.a9
Thus, the Due Process Clause has not been interpreted to demand
of the states the same that the Constitution and Bill of Rights have been
interpreted to demand of the federal government; but, rather, has been
interpreted as a functional element in determining a proper balance be-
tween national and state power. Cognizant of this background, the
present Court is naturally reluctant to enforce a judicially created federal
rule of evidence upon the states.
The four factors discussed are steeped in over a century of judicial
history, and their study is essential to an understanding of the conclu-
sion reached by the Court in the Irvine case-that "due process of law"
does not command exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in state prose-
cutions for state crimes.
Important in determining the significance of the Irvine case is a
consideration of its relation to two preceding search-and-seizure cases
arising from state courts, namely: Rochin v. California40 and Wolf v'.
"Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 52-53 (1947).
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 326 (1937).
"Right of peaceable assembly-Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937);
freedom of speech-De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937) ; freedom of press-
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936) ; freedom of religion-
Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U. S. 245 (1934) ; right of
accused to benefit of counsel-Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).30Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 99 (1908).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
"Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 (1877).
Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct. 381, 391 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
,0342 U. S. 165 (1952). Rochin -was convicted for violating state laws forbidding
possession of morphine. Three deputy sheriffs, having received information that
Rochin was selling narcotics, entered Rochin's home and forced their way into his
bedroom, where Rochin was sitting on a bed. Two capsules of morphine were
lying on a table beside the bed; upon seeing the officers, Rochin swallowed the
capsules. The officers jumped him and tried unavailingly to extract them. Rochin
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Colorado.41
Each of the three cases, Irvine, Rochin, and Wolf, involved two fact
situations relating to actions of police officers: (1) unlawful breaking
and entering, and (2) illegal search and seizure. Additional in the
Rochi case was the element of unlawful assault and battery upon the
accused. Whereas the Rochin conviction was reversed, the Irvine and
Wolf convictions were affirmed. Thus, the distinguishing feature among
the three cases, which led to a decision in Rochin contrary to that in
Irvine and Wolf was the element of coercion in the Rochin case-"coer-
cion... applied by a physical assault... to compel submission to the
use of a stomach pump. '42 The Rochin case held, not that the conviction
should be reversed because the court below admitted evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure (the Court never discussed this aspect of
the case), but rather that Rochin's conviction had "been obtained by
methods that offend the Due Process Clause. '43 The Irvine and Wolf
cases held, however, that the Due Process Clause (the actual language
of the Court was "Fourteenth Amendment") does not forbid admission
of illegally obtained evidence in state prosecutions for state crimes. Thus,
in the three illegal search-and-seizure cases, the Court, under the Four-
teenth Amendment, has reached the same result in Irvine and Wolf and
a contrary result in Rochin.
. An interesting statement in the Irvine case is: "We adere to Wolf
as stating the law of search-and-seizure cases and decline to introduce
vague and subjective distinctions. ' 44 One page earlier in the same
was handcuffed and taken to a hospital, where a doctor forced an emetic solution
through a tube into his stomach, causing him to vomit. In the vomited matter
were found the two capsules, which were admitted in evidence at Rochin's trial,
over his objection. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that it
was obtained by methods that offend the Due Process Clause.
In the present case, Irvine urged the Court to adopt the holding in the Rochin
case. But the Court refused, on the ground that the Irzine case lacked the element
of physical assault, found in the Rochin case. Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct.
381, 383 (1954). For discussions of the Rochin case, see Note, 30 N. C. L. REV.
287 (1952), and Comment, 50 MIisc. L. REV. 1367 (1952).
" 338 U. S. 25 (1949). Wolf, a doctor, was convicted of conspiring with others
to commit abortions. A deputy sheriff and other police officers went to Wolf's
office, searched his appointment book for names of patients, and interrogated these
patients to obtain evidence sufficient to bring him to trial. Wolf objected to the
admission of the books and testimony in evidence as a violation of his rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.
Petitioner Irvine argued that, although the Court had upheld Wolf's conviction,
his conviction should be reversed, on the ground that the invasion of privacy was
more offensive than that involved in the Wolf case. The gist of such an argument
is this: Where a case involves invasion of privacy producing only mild shock, the
Court should affirm the conviction; but where the invasion is more serious, the
Court should reverse. In answer to this argument, the Court stated that the Wolf
case and the Irvine case involved personal invasion of approximately the same
degree, and refused to adopt that criterion for delineation. Irvine v. California, 74
Sup. Ct. 381, 383-384 (1954).
'DId. at 383. " Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 174 (1952).
"Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct. 381, 384 (1954).
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decision it is stated: "Although Rochin raised the search-and-seizure
question, this Court studiously avoided it and never once mentioned the
Wolf case. Obviously, it thought that illegal search and seizure alone
did not call for reversal. '45 What distinctions are being made in deciding
search-and-seizure cases, if not subjective?
That question is answered by the speculation that the Court is caught
in obvious contradiction, for it appears that, despite its statements to
the contrary, the Court has introduced subjective distinctions, as evi-
denced by the fact that degree of offensiveness of police misconduct
would seem to be the only criterion upon which the three cases turned.
If this be true, then the Irvine case indicates two conclusions as regards
future illegal search-and-seizure cases: (1) if police misconduct involves
physical assault or worse, the Court will follow the Rochii approach;
whereas (2), if police misconduct involves less than physical assault, the
Court will follow the Irvine and Wolf approach.48  Perhaps the Irvine
case indicates a trend back to the Wolf line of reasoning in all search-
and-seizure cases, but this cannot be certain, for the Court did not over-
rule or even criticize Rochin in the Irvine case. Whether the Court
admits it, a line appears to have been drawn, but it remains to be seen
if the Court will follow it.
It seems that the Court has not satisfactorily determined its role in
supervising administration of criminal justice in the states. It has not
been successful in avoiding introduction of subjective distinctions into
the illegal search-and-seizure cases, despite its claims to the contrary.
State courts can know only two things: (1) that the Supreme Court
will not reverse a conviction simply because illegally obtained evidence
was admitted in a state prosecution for a state crime; and (2) that the
Supreme Court probably will reverse a conviction parallelling the Rociin
45 Id. at 383.
4' This conclusion is substantiated by the views of the majority of the Court
only (Chief justice Warren and Justices Clark, Jackson, Minton and Reed). Jus-
tice Douglas, however, would reverse all convictions where constitutional rights
have been violated, on the basis of his beliefs that the Bill of Rights should be a
limitation upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the federal
evidentiary rule should be enforced upon the states. justice Black agrees with
justice Douglas, except that he would not enforce the evidentiary rule upon the
states (thus his dissent in rview on Fifth Amendment grounds, but his concurrence
with the majority in Wolf where there were no Fifth Amendment overtones).
It could be said that Justice Frankfurter will reverse a conviction that offends
his concept of "due process of law.'" (He wrote the majority opinion in Rochin
and a dissent in Irvine, on the basis that the convictions had been obtained by
methods which offend "due process of law.") Thus it is difficult to determine
upon what basis he distinguishes the Irvine case from the Wolf case (he wrote
the majority opinion in Wolf), for it was the opinion of the majority in Irvine
that those two cases involved police misconduct offensive in the same respect, if
not in the same degree. Quaere: Has Justice Frankfurter changed his position in
cases paralleling Wolf? He answered negatively in Irvine, but his explanation
did not satisfactorily dispose of the question. Justice Burton joined with Justice
Frankfurter in all three cases.
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case. The greatest difficulty presented by the cases, however, is in justi-
fying the subjective distinctions to the citizens of the United States.
Why is physical assault any more violative of "due process of law," or
antithetical to a concept of ordered liberty, or shocking to the conscience,
or offensive of canons of decency and fairness, or restrictive of funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice, or offensive to human dignity,
or brutal, than surreptitiously breaking and entering a private home,
installing a microphone in a bedroom, boring a hole through the roof,
connecting the microphone with a receiver, and listening to private con-
versations for approximately thirty days? That question the Supreme
Court has not answered.
In place of "writs of assistance," or general search warrants, today
we frequently have no warrants at all. Certainly the liberty of every
man is not "in the hands of every petty officer," but it could be said
that the liberty of Irvine was in the hands of the California police. True,
Irvine was a criminal. But he was also a citizen of the United States.
At his trial, "due process of law" could not command exclusion of in-
criminating evidence obtained by an unscrupulous intrusion of his
privacy.
It seems that distant echoes of the words of James Otis can still be
heard.
J. THaoMAS MANN
Constitutional Law-Special Privileges and Emoluments-
Race Track Franchise
In State v. Felton' the accused consented to become the test de-
fendant, was arrested on August 29, 1953, and tried on a bill of infor-
mation alleging that he "did unlawfully and wilfully place wagers and
bets on a game of chance, to-wit: dog races conducted by the Carolina-
Virginia Racing Association, Inc."2 Judge Hubbard allowed defendant's
motion to quash the bill of information for that by reason of the Curri-
tuck Act of 1949,3 the bill failed to charge the commission of any crime.
In so doing, the judge held the Act constitutional. That Act provided
for a County Racing Commission which was authorized to grant a
franchise to a person for the purpose of racing horses, dogs, or both
horses and dogs.4  "Pari-Mutuel Machines or Appliances" 5 were per-
mitted, provided the qualified voters of Currituck County ratified the
1 239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).
2 State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 577, 80 S. E. 2d 625, 627 (1954).
'N. C. SEss. LAws 1949, c. 541.
' N. C. SEss. LAWS 1949, c. 541, § 2.
* "... a pari-mutuel system is well recognized as a system having no other
purpose that that of providing the facilities . . . for placing bets .... whereby
participants bet on the outcome of the races." State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 582,
80 S. E. 2d 625, 630 (1954).
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Act.6 This Act was ratified, the franchise was given to the Carolina-
Virginia Racing Association, and the track began operations a few miles
from the Virigina line in the town of Moyock. Obviously, if the Act
was constitutional and valid, no crime had been committed, and the
lower court was correct in granting the motion to quash regardless of
the fact that gambling has been held to be a crime.7
In reversing the lower court, the supreme court declared the Act
unconstitutional as violative of Article I, Sections 7 and 31 of the North
Carolina Constitution. Section 31 reads: "Perpetuities and monopolies
are contrary to the genius of a free state and ought not to be allowed."
It is interesting to note, in passing, that failure to provide for suc-
cessors to office in Freeman v. Board of Commissioners,0 was held not
a violation of Section 31, since the General Assembly was presumed to
have power to terminate, change, or continue the appointment. In the
principal case however, the mode of succession, even though clearly
stipulated, was held incompatible with the constitutional section.' 0
The court placed more emphasis on the violation of Section 7, which
provides: "No person or set of persons are entitled to exclusive or sepa-
rate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration
of public services."" Relying on the axiom that "the fundamental prin-
ciple of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it,' 2 counsel for
the Carolina-Virginia Racing Association, as amici curiae, sought to
persuade the court that this section of the constitution was never intended
to apply to situations of this type. 3  An examination of the historical
origin of this section to ascertain just what type of abuses were contem-
plated would seem to be appropriate.
Such a project is as difficult as it is interesting, since both the North
Carolina Constitution and its bill of rights "were read paragraph by
paragraph and discussed (in the convention of 1776) but no record was
made of the discussion."' 4 We are told, however, that "Article three
IN. C. Sass. LAWS 1949, c. 541, § 6.
State v. Brown, 221 N. C. 301, 20 S. E. 2d 286 (1942) ; N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-292 (1952).8 N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 31. This section was held to have been violated be-
cause: (1) the method of filling vacancies in the Racing Commission made possible
a self-perpetuating membership on the Commission; (2) there was ample provision
for voting the Act in, but no provision for voting it out; (3) the franchise was
irrevocable except for failure to comply with rules not spelled out in the statute.
State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 586, 80 S. E. 2d 625, 633 (1954).
"217 N. C. 209, 7 S. E. 2d 354 (1940).
" See note 8 supra.
'IN. C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 7.
2 Perry v. Stancil, 237 N. C. 442, 444, 75 S. E. 2d 512, 514 (1953).
" Brief for Carolina-Virginia Racing Association as A4micus Curiae; State v.
Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).




of the North Carolina Declaration (now Art. I, Section 7, quoted suipra)
was copied verbatim from the 4th Article of the Virginia Declaration,
with the ommission of the clause in the Virginia statement which de-
nounced hereditary officers," 15 an omission which would seem to be
highly significant later in this discussion. Apparently, the "men were too
busy to hesitate to copy verbatim what served their ends.""' It is gen-
erally conceded that the Virginia Declaration of Rights was conceived
and written by George Mason either in Raleigh Tavern, Williamsburg,
without the aid of any reference materials, or in his own library utilizing
Magna Charta, the English Petition of Rights, and various philosophical
works.'1 Counsel, as amici curiae, contended in the principal case that
Mason had in mind, "the abuse of absenteeism, the receipt of fees without
the performance of services by public officers, hereditary office holding
and the like," including "the establishing of a hereditary nobility or
aristocracy possessing special privileges such as existed in England."'
Thus such a grant of a franchise to operate pari-mutuel betting machines
would not be within the purview of the section. Various biographers
seem to substantiate this position. Brant says, "Mason's original draft
covers the following topics:
"4. no hereditary offices .... 19
Rowland contends: "The fourth article declares public service to be the
title to public office and since the former is not descendible, neither should
the latter be hereditary."20
But Hill summarizes the section so that it has a two-fold meaning:
"Except in recognition of public service none shall have a privileged
position in or emoluments from, the community, and no honors are to
be hereditary." 2' Furthermore, if Mason intended to guard against only
the specific evils of hereditary offices, titles of nobility, and public office
malpractices, his composition of that idea into words certainly misled
his colleague, Henry Lee, who observed upon reading the section: "If
a deluge of despotism should sweep over the world and destroy those
" Ketcham, The Sources of the North Carolina Constitution of 1776, 31 NORTE[
CAROLINA HISTORICAL REvIEW 220 (1929). Section 4 of the Virginia Declaration
of Rights reads: "That no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public
services; Which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate,
legislator, or judge to be hereditary." II POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTIu-
TIONS 1909 (1878).
: SIKEs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 69-70.
I ROWLAND, LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE, AND SPEECHES OF GEORGE MASON, c. 7
(1892).
" Brief for Carolina-Virginia Racing Association as Anicus Curiae, p. 18;
State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).
10 I BRANT, JAMES MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REVOLUTIONIST, n. 3, p. 427 (1941).
20 ROWLAND, op. cit. supra note 17, at 245.
21 HILL, GEORGE MASON 141 (1938).
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institutions under which freedom is yet protected ... could this single
sentence of Mason's be preserved it should be sufficient to rekindle the
flame of liberty and revive the race of freemen." 22 Such a high tribute
would hardly be paid to a section directed at prohibiting specific abuses
only. That the section is more of a general statement of the fundamental
inalienable rights of man-equal rights to all, special privileges to none-
is particularly clear when the equivalent section of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, likewise modeled upon the Virginia Declaration,2 is ob-
served to read: "Government is ... instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people, nation or community; and not for
the particular emolument or advantage of a single man, family or set of
men, who are part only of that community. '24  Regardless of exactly
what Mason had in mind when he separated his section into two parts
by means of a semicolon, 25 the section must have conveyed a two-fold
meaning to its adopters: (1) no special privileges except in consideration
of public service, and (2) no hereditary offices.
It is then significant to notice that in copying the Virginia Declara-
tion, North Carolina chose to separate Mason's Section 4 into two sec-
tions: Section 7 quoted supra, which is violated in the principal case;
and Section 30 pertaining to hereditary emoluments, which is not in-
volved or invoked in this case. The only information bearing on the
intention of the North Carolina framers of this section which has been
observed reveals that "Section 7 is in harmony with the 3rd Article of
the Mecklenburg Instructions which advised the representatives to 'op-
pose everything that leans to aristocracy or power in the hands of rich
and chief men exercised to the oppression of the poor.' ",20
If there ever was any doubt concerning the construction and applica-
bility of this section, such uncertainty is not apparent in Bank of New
Bern v. Taylor 2 7 decided some thirty-seven years after the adoption of
the State Constitution. In that case the contention was that the legis-
lative act giving a bank a summary mode of collecting debts, i.e., a spe-
cial privilege, was violative of this section. In disposing of the argument,
the court said that such an "objection will vanish when we reflect that
this privilege is not a gift but the consideration for it is public good to
be derived to the citizens at large from the establishment of the bank."28
12 RowLAND, op. cit. supra note 17, as quoted from LEES, REmiARKS ON JEFFER-
soN 127 (1839).
" "The Massachusetts Bill of Rights and all succeeding instruments of the kind
adopted by the different colonies were modeled upon the Virginia Charter and its
principles were engrafted in the amendments of the Federal Constitution." Row-
LAND, op. cit. srupra note 17, at 250.
" II PooRE, FEDERAL. AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1541 (1878).
2" See note 15 supra.
6 KETCHAM, op. cit. supra note 15, as quoted from the Mecklenburg Instruc-
tions as found in 10 NORTH CAROLINA COLONIAL REcoRDs 870a-870f (1890).21 6 N. C. 266 (1813). 28 Id. at 267.
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Although Section 7 was applicable, the particular legislation came within
the exception clause, "in consideration of public service."
Subsequently, the court has relied on Section 7 to declare unconsti-
tutional the following: charter provision exempting one tobacco ware-
house corporation from liability for negligence when other warehotises
did not enjoy such a privilege ;29 charter provision allowing a bank to
charge excessive rates ;30 statute authorizing the depositors of certain
defunct banks to sell their claims to debtors of the same bank ;31 statute
imposing a license tax on some dry cleaners and allowing other dry
cleaners to operate without this additional charge ;32 statute increasing
the liability of sureties on contractor's bonds in Buncombe County only ;3
statute lessening the punishment for violating the prohibition laws in
only five of the 100 counties ;34 and others.3 5
The court has refused to apply Section 7 to declare unconstitutional
a grant of power of eminent domain to public service corporations be-
cause such is deemed within the exception, "but in consideration of
public service" ;36 a pension plan for school teachers because of the ex-
ception ;37 workman's compensation benefits for deputy sheriffs because
of the exception ;38 and legislation to aid the veterans. 39
The cases cited and others seem to indicate that special privileges
will not be given to an individual corporation or person except "in con-
sideration of public service." Such construction would not seem to be
incompatible with the intention of the framers of that Section. The
Currituck Act, which grants a single organization the privilege of violat-
ing a general law against gambling4 0 while denying this privilege to
others, legalizes gambling only on the premises of the franchise holder,
and permits only the franchise holder and its patrons to violate the
general law, is clearly granting a special privilege to a person41 and is,
therefore, unconstitutional.
M otley & Co. v. Southern Finishing and Warehouse Co., 122 N. C. 347, 30
S. E. 3 (1898) ; Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 528 (1949).
" Simonton v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 498 (1874).
" Edgerton v. Hood, 205 N. C. 816, 172 S. E. 481 (1934).
"= State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. 2d 854 (1940).
" Plott Co. v. Ferguson Co., 202 N. C. 446, 163 S. E. 688 (1932).
" State v. Fowler, 193 N. C. 290, 136 S. E. 709 (1927).
'uE. g., Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N. C. 86, 66 S. E. 2d 22 (1951) ; State
v. Glidden Co., 228 N. C. 664, 46 S. E. 2d 860 (1948) ; and see NORTH CAROLINA
MANUAL 1929 (Newsom ed.); and CONNOR AND CHEsHIRE, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ANNOTATED (1911).
" Carolina-Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee River Power Co., 175 N. C. 668,
96 S. E. 99 (1918).
'7 Bridges v. City of Charlotte, 221 N. C. 472, 20 S. E. 2d 825 (1942).
'
8 Towe v. Yancey County, 224 N. C. 579, 31 S. E. 2d 754 (1944).
"Brumley v. Baxter, 225 N. C. 691, 36 S. E. 2d 281 (1945).
,N. C. GEN STAT. § 14-292 (1952) : "If any person play at any game of chance
at which any money, property or other thing is bet, whether the same be in stake
or not, both those who play and those who bet thereon shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor."
" State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).
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On the other hand, counties as political subdivisions have been the
recipients of privileges not enjoyed by other counties. 42  Apparently,
"no person or set of persons" refers to persons who are under the same
circumstances or conditions and does not refer to areas as such. 48 In
Salsburg v. Maryland, Justice Burton said: "The equal protection clause
relates to equality between persons as such rather than between areas." 44
That case would seem to be an acceptable summation of the law on
equal protection sections of the state constitutions as well as that of the
Federal Constitution. If the phrase, "no person or set of persons" is
construed to include counties, then such familiar acts as those creating
Alcoholic Beverage Control are also unconstitutional. These acts have
not been declared so, although the attempt was made by a group of
prominent citizens45 when the ABC Acts were first enacted by the
General Assembly.46  It is true that in that case the court refused to
rule on the constitutionality of the ABC Acts, saying that the question
was not properly before the court,47 but Alcoholic Beverage Control is
still available on the county option plan in spite of the general prohibi-
tion law. Obviously, these Acts confer special privileges, but these
privileges are directed to the county while the gambling Acts ultimately
channel special benefits to individual persons or corporations, 48 and
therein lies the important distinction. The court in the principal case
anticipated the problem that would be created if a county itself or a
private individual or corporation serving as an agency of the county
operated racing enterprises, but the court found other ways to decide the
issue without answering this more important question. 49
In view of the fact that counties as political subdivisions of the state
do not seem to be within the purview of Section 7, and considering the
vast number of local legislative acts, including those creating Alcoholic
Beverage Control, which are passed each session by the General Assem-
bly, it would seem that a careful draft of legislation permitting counties
"'E.g., N. C. SEss. LAws 1953, c. 135, An Act to Establish a Law Library for
the Public Officials and Courts in New Hanover County; c. 715, An Act Authoriz-
ing Wilson County to Establish a Law Library; c. 1158, An Act to Establish a
County Court Library in Cumberland County.
"' N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 7; State v. Fowler, 193 N. C. 290, 135 S. E. 709 (1927),
in which the court said: "This provision, we think, is a guaranty that every valid
enactment of a general law applicable to the whole state shall operate uniformly
upon persons and property, giving to all under like circumstances equal protection
and security and neither laying burdens nor conferring privileges upon any person
that are not laid or conferred upon others under the same circumstances or condi-
tions."
"Salsburg v. State of Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954).
"Newman v. Commissioners of Vance, 208 N. C. 675, 182 S. E. 453 (1935).
' N. C. PuB. LAws 1935, cc. 418, 493.
Newman.v..Commissioners of Vance, 208 N. C. 675, 182 S. E. 453 (1935).
".State v. Feltbn, 239 N. C. 575, 588, 8Q S. E. 2d 625, 635 (1954) ; N. C. Pun.-
Loc. LAws 1939, c. 540; N. C. Sass. LAws 1949, c. 541.
" State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 587, 80 S. E. 2d 625, 634 (1954).
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to own and operate racing establishments wherein pari-mutuel betting
is permitted could not be declared unconstitutional as violative of Sec-
tion 7, Section 31, or any other section of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion. If this contention is accepted, then the responsibility for permitting
dog and horse racing with its counterpart, pari-mutuel betting, to infil-
trate the North Carolina scene rests solely upon the General Assembly.50
ROBERT D. LEWIS.
Credit Transactions-Conditional Sale Contracts-Default-Remedies
of Buyer and Seller-Liability of Buyer on Check or Note
Given as Down Payment or Installment Payment
In 1893 the North Carolina Supreme Court remarked that condi-
tional sale contracts "are becoming greater in frequency and general
interest. They are principally used in connection with the sale of sewing-
machines, pianos, furniture, soda-fountains, rolling stock on railroads,
and the like."' Today the frequency of such contracts is still increasing,
and the list of products sold under them must be enlarged to include a
variety of recently developed chattels, such as automobiles, television
sets, home appliances, adding machines, and factory equipment.
A typical form of conditional sale contract involves the credit sale
of personal property, where the buyer usually makes a down payment
and undertakes, often by a promissory note, to pay the balance of the
price in installments. Under the contract the buyer receives immediate
possession of the property, and the seller retains title as security together
with the accompanying right to repossession and resale in case of default,2
but the buyer has the power to gain complete title by making full pay-
ment. It is explained that the seller's retention of title distinguishes this
contract from a purchase money chattel mortgage where complete title
is vested in the buyer who immediately reconveys security title to the
seller.3
" For an excellent r~sum6 of racetrack operations in North Carolina, see Ra-
leigh News and Observer, February 14 through 18, 1951, a feature story in five
chapters by Jim Chaney.
1 Puffer & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 378, 383, 17 S. E. 174, 175 (1893).
The instrument that caused this comment was entitled a "lease," requiring periodic
"rentals" until title to a "soda water machine" was conveyed upon full payment,
but the court held it was a conditional sale contract.
2 Earlier notes have stated that in North Carolina the secured party under a
conditional sale contract has the right to repossession before default, unless the
parties manifest a contrary intention by agreement or conduct, and all the writers
suggest that this is undesirable. Notes, 21 N. C. L. REv. 387 (1943) ; 12 N. C. L.
REv. 254 (1934) ; 11 N. C. L. REv. 321 (1933).
'Frick & Co. v. Hilliard, 94 N. C. 117, 119 (1886); Gaul v. Goldburg Furniture
& Carpet Co., 85 Misc. 426, - , 147 N. Y. Supp. 516, 518 (Sup. Ct 1914);
Bogert, The Evolution of the Conditional Sales Law in New York, 8 CORNELL L. Q.
303, 304 (1923). --
However, the North Carolina court, in construing N. C. LAWS 1883, c. 342.
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After default, the conditional sale contract gives rise to legal questions
(1) as to the buyer's right to recover down payments or installment
payments, (2) as to the seller's liability for a wrongful repossession or
wrongful conduct while retaking the property sold, and (3) as to the
seller's remedies: suit on the contract; repossession and disposition of
the security; and suit for a deficiency judgment after repossession and
a resale of the property.
According to the weight of authority, the defaulting buyer cannot
recover any of the payments made prior to a proper repossession,4 unless
the seller has rescinded the agreement.5 Otherwise, "it would be offering
later N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-23 (1950), which provided for the registration of con-
ditional sale contracts "with the same legal effect as . . .chattel mortgages," has
stripped this analytical distinction of significance, indicating that conditional sale
contracts and chattel mortgages are of identical legal effect. Observer Mfg. Co.
v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 43, 94 S. E. 526, 527 (1917). For a recent restatement,
see Mitchell v. Battle, 231 N. C. 68, 69, 55 S. E. 2d 803 (1949): "Conditional
sales contracts in which title is retained as security for the debt are treated here
as chattel mortgages ... and statutes relating to chattel mortgage foreclosures and
incidents have more than analogical force." The 1883 statute was repealed at the
last session of the North Carolina General Assembly. N. C. SEss. LAWS 1953,
c. 1190, § 3. For comment on this statutory change see A Survey of Statutory
Changes in North Carolina in 1953, 31 N. C. L. REV. 375, 429 (1953).
See Sneeden v. Nurnberger's Market, 192 N. C. 439, 440, 135 S. E. 328, 330
(1926), distinguishing a chattel mortgage where title but not necessarily possession
is transferred to the secured party, from a pledge where the secured party takes
possession immediately "with a right of retainer until the debt is paid," but no title.
2 WiLLIsToN, SALES § 337 (Rev. ed. 1948) explains that the conditional sale dis-
cussed herein does not involve land.
' 3 WI.isTON, SALES § 579c (Rev. ed. 1948) ; Note, 17 MINN. L. REV. 66, 70
(1932) ; Note, 37 A. L. R. 91, 100 (1925), and cases cited therein. Contra: Mo.
Rxv. STAT. § 428.110 (1949), and OHio REV. CODE § 1319.14 (1953), requiring a
refund by the seller.
' Courts following the "election doctrine," as described below in the text, have
used the term "rescission" in describing the seller's election to repossess the security
rather than attempt a collection of the contract price. This is improper, because a
true rescission obliterates the contract, requiring the seller to return any payments
he has received. Daughley v. Peterson, 110 F. Supp. 885, 887 (D. Ala. 1953).
Decisions cited contrary to the rule allowing the seller to retain the defaulting
buyer's payments under a conditional sale contract often involve recovery of pay-
ments following a true rescission of the conditional sale contract, and are therefore
in accord with the majority view. See Weldon v. Witt, 145 Ala. 605, 40 So. 126
(1905), where there was a mutual rescission of the contract, and Moye v. Stobaugh,
199 Ark. 453, 135 S. W. 2d 334 (1940), where the security, a refrigerator, was
found defective and the contract rescinded.
In the following cases the contract was rescinded by the seller's conduct, and
the buyer was allowed to recover payments made less compensation for the use of
the property sold: Southern Finance Co. v. Chambers, 65 Ga. App. 259, 15 S. E.
2d 903 (1941) (Seller received possession of car to repair and .retained it, selling
it after default made subsequent to the time he gained possession.) ; Carmichael v.
Guenette, 61 Ga. App. 460, 6 S. E. 2d 365 (1939) (Seller rescinded by repossessing
car after agreeing to extend time for payments.); Dickerson v. Universal Credit
Co., 47 Ga. App. 512, 170 S. E. 822 (1933) (rescission by bringing trover suit).
Cf. Burge v. Crown Finance Co., Inc., 81 Ga. App. 582, 59 S. E. 2d 541 (1950).
Here the seller who had repossessed the security conducted a resale after promising
the buyer that he would extend the payment date, and the court reasoned that the
promise was without consideration, concluding that the buyer had no cause of
action against the seller. The court failed to distinguish the case from Carnichacl
v. Gueneite, and cited no authority.'
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a bounty for the violation of contracts," because the buyer cduld pur-
chase a chattel for speculative resale and default without reason, yet his
liability would be limited to compensation for the use of the property.6
The seller's right to sue for a breach of contract 7 or for the contract
price8 is recognized in North Carolina, but his most satisfactory remedy
is to retake the property sold, resell it and recover any deficiency found
by subtracting the down payment, installment payments and proceeds
realized by the resale from the price due the seller and the costs of the
sale.9 After repossession of the property sold, the buyer retains an equity
in it,10 and has been given the opportunity to redeem the property before
resale by paying the balance due under the contract.1 If the payments
and the proceeds of a resale exceed the total obligation, the buyer is
entitled to this "surplus.' u2  Although repossession and resale are ordi-
Another manner of rescission by conduct applicable in jurisdictions that require
a resale is explained in Blevins Aircraft Corp. v. Gardner, 66 Ga. App. 843, 845, 19
S. E. 2d 350, 352 (1942) : "the mere retaking of the property by the seller would
not constitute a rescission of the contract of sale, yet where the seller, after re-
taking the property, refrains for an unreasonable length of time from selling it ...
and devotes the property to a use inconsistent with an intention on his part to
resell it . . . , the inference is authorized that the seller has elected to treat the
property as his own, thereby rescinding the contract of sale."
The North Carolina Supreme Court has accurately stated that "repossession
of the title-retained property is not to be referred to the principle of rescission,
but to the power of sale given by statute [or contract]... ." Mitchell v. Battle, 231
N. C. 68, 69, 55 S. E. 2d 803 (1949). The statute referred to is N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 45-21.13 (1950), conferring a power of sale upon the seller where the conditional
sale contract does not contain an express power of sale.
'Pfeiffer v. Norman, 22 N. D. 168, 174, 133 N. W. 97, 99 (1911).
'See National Cash Register Co. v. Hill, 136 N. C. 272, 276, 48 S. E. 637, 639(1904).
" Ibid.
' Mitchell v. Battle, 231 N. C. 68, 55 S. E. 2d 803 (1949) ; Hall v. Tillman, 103
N. C. 276, 9 S. E. 194 (1889) ; second appeal, 110 N. C. 220, 14 S. E. 745 (1892);
third appeal, 115 N. C. 500, 20 S. E. 726 (1894).
Such procedure is specifically authorized in N. C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1950):
"Whenever a power of sale contained in a conditional sale contract, or granted by
statute with respect thereto, is exercised, and the proceeds of such sale are not
sufficient to defray the expenses thereof, and also the balance of retaking, keeping
and storing the goods and the balance due upon the purchase price, the seller may
recover the deficiency from the buyer, or from anyone who has succeeded :to the
obligations of the buyer."
Accord: Federal Credit Co. v. Boleware, 163 Miss. 830, 142 So. 1 (1932)
Caraway v. jean, 97 N. H. 506, 92 A. 2d 660 (1952); Knudson Music Co. v.
Masterson, 240 P. 2d 973 (Utah 1952) ; see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Dickinson, 249 Ky. 422, 425, 60 S. W. 2d 967, 968 (1933).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (1950) limits deficiency judgments "When any sale
of real estate or personal property has been made by a mortgagor, trustee, or other
person authorized to make the same, at which the mortgagee, payee or other holder
of the obligation thereby secured becomes the purchaser. . . ." Although this
language is quite broad, quaere whether the statute is applicable to conditional sales,
in light of N. C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1950) supra.
'
0 See Puffer & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 377, 384, 17 S. E. 174, 175
(1893). &
"
1 Puffer & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 377, 17 S_ E. 174 (1893) ; see
Hamilton v. Highlands, 144 N, C. 279, 284, 56 S. E. 929, 931 (1907).
"Hamilton v. Highlands, 144 N. C. 279, $6 S. E. 929 (1907),; Puffer & Sons
1954]
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narily carried out without judicial supervision, where the seller brings
a well founded suit on the conditional sale contract after a default, the
trial court -may order that the property be resold and the proceeds
applied to payment of the debt, and then enter a deficiency judgment or
give a surplus to the buyer, depending upon whether the obligation is
satisfied by the proceeds.13
Some jurisdictions are in accord with North Carolina,14 but by what
has been called the general holding apart from statute,'0 the seller must
elect whether he will sue on the contract and relinquish his rights in the
security, or repossess the property, thereby terminating both the buyer's
liability under the contract and the buyer's equity in the property.16
Since the use of one remedy is considered a bar to recovery under the
other, and there is never a deficiency judgment, this rule may at first
appear to protect the buyer. Actually, it works a great hardship on
the individual who has purchased property, and paid a large amount of
the price, by allowing the seller to retain all these payments and repossess
the security without accounting for its value, which may be far greater
than the sum due under the contract. It may also be unfair to the seller
who chooses to sue on the contract because the property is depreciated,
only to find that the buyer is insolvent. 17  Still other states follow this
Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 377, 17 S. E. 174 (1893); see Universal C. I. T.
Credit Corp. v. Saunders, 235 N. C. 369, 371, 70 S. E. 2d 176, 178 (1952), where
the court said a repossessing seller must account to the defaulting buyer for the
value of the property repossessed.
Accord: Epps v. Howard, 87 Ga. App. 277, 73 S. E. 2d 342 (1952) ; Cutting v.
Whittmore, 72 N. H. 107, 54 Atl. 1098 (1903); see General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Dickinson, 249 Ky. 422, 425, 60 S. W. 2d 967, 968 (1933) ; Ross-Meehan
Brake Shoe Foundry Co. v. Pascagoula Ice Co., 72 Miss. 608, 615, 18 So. 364, 365
(1895).
"Hamilton v. Highlands, 144 N. C. 279, 56 S. E. 929 (1907) ; Puffer & Sons
Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 377, 17 S. E. 174 (1893).
14 See footnotes 9 and 12 supra.
The New Hampshire court has stated the rule, "Resort to repossession and suit
for the price should not bar each other, and the remedies may well and properly
be concurrent to the point of satisfaction," in Mercier v. Nashua, 84 N. H. 59, 62,
146 Atl. 165, 167 (1929).
Virginia gives the seller five remedies against a defaulting buyer: "(1) To seek
the peaceable possession of the trucks (in the event redelivery was denied by the
defendant) ; (2) to institute an action at law for the recovery of the unpaid pur-
chase price; (3) to institute a suit in equity to foreclose the lien; (4) to proceed
under the ... Code for the sale or possession of the property and for a deficiency
judgment; or (5) by action of detinue under . . ." statute; and the first three are
said to be cumulative. Lloyd v. Federal Motor Truck Co., 168 Va. 72, 77, 190
S. E. 257, 259 (1937).
As discussed below in the text, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and Uniform
Commercial Code bear some similarity to the North Carolina view.
" 3 Wuusroiq, SALEs § 579b (Rev. ed. 1948).
"Thomas Auto Co. v. Moody, 206 Ark. XIX, 177 S. W. 2d 754 (1944) ; Igle-
heart Bros., Inc. v. John Deere Plow Co., 114 Ind. App. 182, 51 N. E. 2d 498 (1943)(Indiana court presumed the Illinois common law was identical to its own, that
seller after default must make an election.).; C. I. T. Corporation v. Fisher, 187
Okla. 314, 102 P..2d 848 (1940).
" 'The uniform acts on -this subject-are designed to eliminate the possibility of
either of these results, as shown below in the text.
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election doctrine, but add a remedy called a "conditional sale contract
vendor's lien,"' 8 which enables the seller to bring a court action on the
security, sell it and if the price is still unsatisfied, obtain a deficiency
judgment' 9-the same process as that used in North Carolina when the
seller seeks judicial enforcement of the conditional sale contract after
default.
The seller is always penalized for an unauthorized retaking of the
property sold, 20 and most jurisdictions condemn the use of actual2 ' or
"implied" 22 force in making an authorized repossession. Further, the
seller has been held liable for conversion: where he gained possession
of the security through an authdrized retaking, extended the time in
which payments could be made, but conducted a resale prior to the
extended date of payment ;23 also, where the seller h6ld the security under
an agreement to repair it until a default was made under the conditional
sale contract, and then resold the property without notifying the buyer
of his intention to resell.24 Although most of these cases contemplate
an award of actual damages,25 punitive damages are not unknown.2
6
8 Explained in National Cash Register Co. v. Ness, 204 Minn. 148, 151, 282
N. W. 827, 829 (1938). See Note, 23 MixN. L. Rzv. 699 (1939).
"0 Smith v. Russell, 223 Iowa 123, 272 N. W. 121 (1937) ; National Cash Regis-
ter Co. v. Ness, 204 Minn. 148, 282 N. W. 827 (1938) ; see Lloyd v. Federal Motor
Truck Co., 168 Va. 72, 77, 190 S. E. 257, 259 (1937).
" Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp. of Calif., 111 Cal. App. 2d 431, 244
P. 2d 764 (1952) (Seller tried to enforce a note that was not a part of the condi-
tional sale contract, by repossessing the security.).1 Lamb v. Woodry, 154 Ore. 30, 58 P. 2d 1257 (1936). The courts of Louisiana
are most strict in this regard, having held a seller liable where he peaceably
entered the defaulting buyer's home and removed furniture that was security under
his conditional sale contract, with the consent of the buyer's mother and minor
son but without lawful process authorizing such action. Strahan v. Simmon, 15
So. 2d 164 (La. App. 1943).
" In American Discount Co. v. Wyckroff, 29 Ala. App. 82, -, 191 So.. 790,
794 (1939), implied force was defined as an act revealing an intention to take the
security in any event, with force if necessary. North Carolina is in accord, apply-
ing this definition where the seller's agents emphatically replied to the buyer's
objection to their retaking of the property that they would "take the car or have
the money." Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E.
2d 894, 896 (1942).
"' Brewer v. Universal Credit Co., 191 Miss. 183, 192 So. 902 (1940) ; Central
Ins. Co. of Baltimore v. Ehr, 18 Wash. 2d 489, 139 P. 2d 701 (1943). The agree-
ment to extend the time for payments is effective, not because of any legal con-
sideration, but "may be rested upon the ground, of estoppel or of waiver." Reinkey
v. Findley Electric Co., 147 Minn. 161, 163, 180 N. W. 236, 237 (1920).
Cf. Carmichael v. Guenette, 61 Ga. App. 460, 6 S. E. 2d 365 (1939). Contra:
Burge v. Crown Finance Co., Inc., 81 Ga. App. 582, 59 S. E. 2d 541 (1950) ; see
footnote 5 supra.
"
4 Patton v. Alexander, 202 Ark. 883, 154 S. W. 2d 1 (1941); ef. Southern
Finance Co. v. Chambers, 65 Ga. App. 259, 15 S. E. 2d 903 (1941) ; see footnote 5
sup ra.
2r' Quick v. Woodward Motor Co., 23 Tenn. App. 254, 130 S. W. 2d 147 (1938);
Ashworth v. Fleenor, 178 Va. 104, 16 S. E. 2d 309 (1941).
"Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E. 2d 894
(1942) (Seller was guilty of forcible trespass because he used implied force in
retaking a car.); Commercial Credit Co, v. Spence, 185 Miss. 293, 184 So.. 439
(1938) (Seller's assignee repossessed car, knowing. the buyer had failed to make
19541
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There are two uniform acts providing the seller with statutory reme-
dies after default-the Uniform Conditional Sales Act2 7 and the Uniform
Commercial Code.2  They provide for a redemption period following
default and repossession,29 during which the buyer may reclaim the
security by paying the amount due under the contract. If there is no
redemption, the buyer may demand a resale;8° and resale is also com-
pulsory under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act if the buyer has paid
one-half the purchase price,31 and under the Uniform Commercial Code
if the security is "consumer goods"3 2 and sixty per cent of the price is
paid. 33 If there be a resale both acts hold the buyer liable for a defi-
ciency84 but grant him any surplus 5 realized from the resale, as in North
Carolina. When resale is not compulsory, the seller may chose to resell
or keep the property,3 6 but the buyer is discharged from the contract
final payments only because assignee refused to band over the note that evidenced
his indebtedness.).
"' This act, prepared by Professor Bogert and recommended by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, is now in force in Arizona,
Delaware, Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, South Dakota, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Alaska and Hawaii. 2 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 6
(Supp. 1954).
28 A product of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, considered in many states and enacted
last year in Pennsylvania. Schnader, Pennsylvania Leads the Way: The First
State to Enact the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 CONFERENCE ON PERSONAL
FINANCE LAw QUARTERLY REPORT 72 (1953).
20 Pursuant to the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT §§ 17, 18, if notice of the
seller's intention to repossess is given the defaulting buyer forty to twenty days
before repossession, the buyer may redeem his interest in the security by paying
the amount due at any time before repossession; if there is repossession without
this notice, the buyer has a ten day period for redemption. Under the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-506, the buyer may redeem the security at any time before
resale or the seller's election to retain the security.
"0 UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 20 (within ten days after the retaking);
UNIFORM COMMER cIAL CODE § 9-505 (2) (within thirty days after receiving a
required notice from the seller revealing his intention to retain the property).
" UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 19 (Sale must be conducted within thirty
days following repossession.).
"' Goods are consumer goods if they are used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family or household purposes ... " UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
109(1).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-505(1) (sale conducted within ninety days
after repossession). Absent a request for it, resale is not compulsory if the buyer
has signed away his right to it, or when the contract does not cover a "purchase
money security interest." As defined in § 9-107, such an interest includes the type
of conditional sale contract discussed herein.
"' UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 22; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
504(1). The latter applies only where a "security agreement secures an indebted-
ness . . . " which includes the type of conditional sale contract discussed herein.
" UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 21; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
504(1) (under the circumstances explained in footnote 33 supra).
"
0 UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT §20; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-
.505(2). Under the former act, the seller must give the buyer notice of his inten-
tion to resell within ten days after repossession but no notice of a retention of the
property is required of the seller; the Commercial Code is similar, but the seller
must give notice of his intention to retain the security, and there is no strict time
limit requiring a decision fo retain or resell.
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if there is no resale.37 To compel the seller to abide by the acts, the
buyer is given a cause of action against him for failure to meet the statu-
tory requirements.38 These uniform acts attempt to reconcile the in-
terests of buyer and seller by giving each party the right to have a
resale, providing for a redemption period and other more mechanical
requirements, such as time limitations and notices of resale.3 9 The
buyer who has paid a certain large portion of the price is given additional
protection by the mandatory resale. Although the acts are basically
quite similar, the Uniform Commercial Code encourages private re-
sales40 and is drawn in broad terms to cover other types of security
transactions in addition to conditional sales.41
An additional problem is posed by a 1954 decision of the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court.42  This case involved a check, given as a cash
down payment by the buyer of a truck under a conditional sale contract,
that remained unpaid after proceeds from a resale failed to satisfy the
price, and the buyer was held liable on the check, although the seller's
conduct discharged the buyer of "all obligation" under Section 23 of the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act in force in West Virginia. 43  A dissent
argued that the down payment, and the written undertaking for the
balance of .the price that described the rights of the parties, should be
treated as one "obligation" under Section 23, and any discharge of the
"obligation" would include an unpaid check given as down payment.44
Under the same fact situation, absent the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act, the buyer would be liable on this check in jurisdictions holding the
North Carolina view, for the seller is entitled to an amount equal to the
"
T UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 23; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-
505(2).
S UNIFORM CONDITIONA. SALES AcT § 25 (actual damages and in no event less
than one-fourth of all payments made); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-507(1)
,Sactual damages and if security is "consumer goods," at least the amount of the
service charge!' and ten per cent of the cash price).
" Also, requirement of a seller's statement of the balance due under the con-
tract, UNIFORM CONDITONAL SALES AcT § 18; seller's notice of resale where it is
not compulsory, Id. at § 20, and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(2) ; adver-
tisement before a required public sale, UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 19.
"o See draftsmen's comment following UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-504 (Text
and comments ed. 1952): "Although public sale is recognized, it is hoped that
private sale will be encouraged where.. as is frequently the case, private sale through
commercial channels will result in higher realization on collateral for the benefit
of all parties. The only restriction on the secured party's method of disposition
is that it must be commercially reasonable."
'I Compare the stricter time limits of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act with
the requirements of "good faith" and "commercially reasonable" action that are
set up in the Uniform Commercial Code. Draftsmen's comment, UNIFORM CoM-
MERCIAL CODE § 9-507 (Text and comments ed. 1952).
'
2 West Virginia Mack Sales Co. v. Henderson, 81 S.E. 2d 103 (W. Va. 1954).
"The seller had retained the truck over the resale period without giving notice
of his intention to resell, which constituted an election to retain it and discharged-
the buyer, who had paid less than one-half the contract price, under § 23 of the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
"West Virginia Mack Sales Co. v. Brown, 81, S. E. 2d 103, 111 (W. Va. 1954).
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contract price in any event. Where the election doctrine prevails the
buyer's liability turns on whether the check or note given as cash down
payment was a part of the conditional sale contract. 45 However, the
courts seem to differ on whether the term "conditional sale contract"
includes only the written undertaking making the conditional transfer
of the property, or encompasses paper given as down payment also.40
If it is determined that the check or note given as cash down payment
was a part of the conditional sale contract, an election to repossess the
security is regarded as a bar to suit on it, as weli as the undertaking for
the balance ;47 and presumably, when the seller elects to sue on the con-
tract rather than repossess, the paper given as cash down payment and
the undertaking will stand together again, and the seller may recover on
both. A check or note given as cash down payment that is not a part
of the conditional sale contract is treated as consideration for the "use
and wear of the property," and the buyer is liable thereon, even after'
repossession.48
An equitable treatment of the parties to a check or note given either
as down payment or installment payment would: (1) adopt the North
Carolina view on the remedies of buyer and seller after default; (2)
disregard whether the paper is part of the conditional sale contract; and
(3) hold the buyer liable unless he could recover the amount of the
check or note had it been paid. Applying this treatment, the seller would
recover if there were a suit for the price without repossession, or in case
of a resale, to the extent of any deficiency apart from the check or note;
but the buyer would not be liable where there was no deficiency or the
seller rescinded the contract. This would not penalize the conscientious
"' In Crute v. La Porte Discount Corp., 89 Ind. App. 573, -, 167 N. E. 542,
543 (1929), after observing that the buyer's note given as a down payment was
"a part of the original conditional agreement," the court held that the buyer was
released by the seller's election to recover the security and distinguished Norman
v. Meeker, 91 Wash. 534, 158 Pac. 78 (1916), where a buyer was liable on his note
given as down payment, as follows: "In that case, the note sued on, and alleged to
have been given in lieu of a cash payment for property purchased, was a plain
promissory note, and was no part of the conditional sale contract."
". Compare Beene Motor Co., Inc. v. Dison, 180 Ark. 1064, 23 S. W. 2d 971
(1930), concerning a conditional sale contract that recited, "'The buyer has this
day paid to the seller two hundred and eighty-six ($286.00) dollars . . . '" which
the court interpreted as including the buyer's note for that amount given as down
payment with Franz v. Hair, 76 Utah 281, 283, 289 Pac. 130, 131 (1930), where
the conditional sale contract read, "'the purchaser has this day paid to the seller
two thousand five hundred sixty-seven and No/100 dollars ($2,567.00) ... '" and
the court held the buyer's note given in down payment for a part of this sum was
not included in the conditional sale contract.
"Beene Motor Co., Inc. v. Dison, 180 Ark. 1064, 1067, 23 S. W. 2d 971, 972
(1930) : "Since the $286 note . . .was included in the conditional sale agreement
for the sale of the truck, was a part of the purchase price recited therein, and title
to the property was retained until the whole purchase price was paid, it necessarily
follows ... that when appellant [seller] elected to retake the truck, it also elected
to cancel the balance of the indebtedness due against the car, which had the effect
of relieving appellee [buyer]. .. ."
"' Norman v. Meeker, 91 Wash. 534, 538, 158 Pac. 78, 80 (1916).
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buyer who pays in cash or whose check or note is paid before reposses-
sion by allowing a tardy buyer to escape liability, and it would conform
with the intention of the parties that the amount of a check or note given
as cash down payment would be paid. In the final analysis, the seller
and buyer would be neither better nor worse off than they would have
been if cash had been paid in the place of the check or note.
Roy W. DAvis, JR.
Labor Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-Nonexempt Work
Tolerance for Executives
A great many decisions determining whether, under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, a particular employee is a "bona fide executive," have
turned on the sections of the regulations issued by the Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor relating to
nonexempt work tolerance. One writer has estimated that at least half
of the overtime violations of the Act emanate from misinterpretations of
the executive exemption.1 The various administrative regulations dealing
with this exemption have therefore been chosen for comment in this note.
Section 13 (a) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act exempts from
the provisions of Section 6 (minimum wage), and Section 7 (maximum
hours) of the Act, any employee who is employed in a bona fide execu-
tive capacity, as such term is defined and delimited by the regulations
of the Administrator.2 The reason for this exemption is that a bona
fide executive is not ordinarily in the group that requires the protection
of the Act.3
It is to be noted at the outset that the Administrator's definition of
a "bona fide executive" is given Congressional sanction and is controlling
in determining who shall be exempt from the Act.4 The North Carolina
Supreme Court, in applying the Administrator's definition, has said:
"Valid definitions within the delegated power speak with authority and
become the dictionary of the law." 5
Since 1938, when the Fair Labor Standards Act became effective,
the Administrator has acted three times to define the term "bona fide
I Bookstabler, Exemption of the "Boss Man" Under Section 13 (a), (1) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 69 N. J. L. J. 81 (1946). It is to be noted that since
all of the requirements of the definition must be met and since Section (f) of the
present definition requires that the employee be compensated on a salary basis at
a rate of not less than $55 per week, except in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands
where the minimum salary is $30, there are few cases where the general minimum
wage requirements of the act have been involved; most of the cases involve com-
pensation for overtime.
252 STAT. 1067 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §213 (1952). The Act's original provision
has remained unchanged since 1938.
' Bookstabler, supra note 1.
'Zaetz v. General Instrument Corp., 21 N. J. Misc. 76, 30 A. 2d 504 (1943).
' Pye v. Atlantic Co., 223 N. C. 92, 96, 25 S. E. 2d 401, 404 (1943).
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executive capacity." In each of these definitions there has been some
limit placed on the amount of nonexempt work which may be performed
by an executive employee without losing his exemption. In the definition
which went into effect simultaneously with the Act itself, the term
"employee employed in a bona fide executive capacity" was defined in
relation to nonexempt work tolerance as "one who does no substantial
amount of work of the same nature as that performed by nonexempt
employees of the employer." 6 While this original "white-collar" regu-
lation defined both executive and administrative employees together,
both the later regulations contain a separate definition for exempt admin-
istrative and executive employees.7
Section (f) of the Administrator's definition of an executive em-
ployee, which was in effect from 1940 to 1950, relating to nonexempt
work, required that the employee's work of the same nature as that per-
formed by nonexempt employees not exceed 20 per cent of the number
of hours worked in any workweek by nonexempt employees under his
direction, except where the employee was in sole charge of an inde-
pendent establishment or a physically separated branch establishment.8
During this same period there was no similar 20 per cent limitation in
the Administrator's definition of an "administrative employee." Since
there was no similar requirement at least one court held a factory super-
intendent to be exempt as an administrative employee even though the
time he spent on nonexempt activities exceeded 20 per cent of the work-
week of the nonexempt employees under his direction, on the ground
that the nonexempt activities were not wholly without relation to his
primary responsibility." This ruling illustrates the distinction which
still exists between executive and administratve employees.
The present defintion of "bona fide executive," which became effec-
tive on January 25, 1950, lists six requirements which must be met
before the employee is exempt from the coverage of the Act.10 If an
'George Lawley & Sons Corp. v. South, 140 F. 2d 439 (1st Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 322 U. S. 746 (1944) ; Roberts v. John Sperry Co., 7 W. H. Cases (BNA)
349 (D. Mass. 1947).
'WAGE AND HoUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:615 (1948).
829 CODE FED. REGs. § 541.1 (Cum. Supp. 1949).
Sparks v. Pedersen, 9 W. H. Cases (BNA) 156 (D. Conn. 1949).
10 "The term 'employee employed in a bona fide executive ... capacity' in sec-
tion 13 (a) (1) of the act shall mean any employee-
(a) whose primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which
he is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof;
and
(b) who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other
employees therein; and
(c) who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions
and recommendations as to the hiring or firing and as to the advancement and
promotion or any other change of status of other employees will be given particular
weight; and
(d) who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers; and
(e) who does not devote more than 20 per cent of his hours worked in the
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employee fails to meet any one of the requirements, he is not exempt."
Section (e) of the present regulations takes the place of Section (f)
of the regulations in effect until 1950 and requires that the employee shall
not devote more than 20 per cent of his hours worked in the workweek
to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance
of his managerial functions.'
2
As has been noted, prior to 1940 the definition of a "bona fide execu-
tive" used the words "substantial amount" in referring to the quantity
of nonexempt work which the executive might perform without loss of
his exemption.'3  Much criticism was directed to the vagueness and
ambiguity of this wording.' 4 The Stein Report, which was later adopted
as the official explanation of the new definitions in 1940,15 suggested
that instead of deletion, an arithmetic-l equivalent be substituted.' 6 The
result was the old Section (f) requirement that an employee not spend
more than 20 per cent of the time spent by his subordinates doing non-
exempt work. These requirements were obviously inserted to prevent
merely nominal classification of employees for the purpose of evading the
coverage of the act.17 A typical and unsuccessful attempt at evasion
was an employer's affixation of the label "building superintendent" to
an employee whose duties would generally be performed by a janitor and
who exercised only slight supervision over other employees.' 8
Under old Section (f) it was possible for an employee to spend more
than 20 per cent of his own time in nonexempt activities, at purely
physical tasks of the same general nature as those of the employees work-
ing under him, and still be exempt as an executive. The Stein Report
said that the base upon which the percentage was to be taken was not the
workveek of the employee himself, since on that basis he could obtain
exemption merely by increasing his hours of exempt work.' 9 Two
workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance
of the work described in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section: Provided,
That this paragraph (e) shall not apply in the case of an employee who is in sole
charge of an independent establishment or a physically separated branch establish-
ment, or who owns at least a 20 per cent interest in the enterprise in which he is
employed; and
(f) who is compensated for his services on a salary basis at a rate of not less
than $55 per week. (or $30 per week if employed in Puerto Rico or the Virgin
Islands) exclusive of board, lodging, or other facilities... " 29 CODE FED. REGS.§ 541.1 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
12 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 541.99 (c) (Cum. Supp. 1953) ; Fanelli v. United States
Gypsum Co., 141 F. 2d 216 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Rankin v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 98
F. Supp. 1 (D. N. 3. 1951); Kreeft v. R. W. Bates-Price Dye Works, Inc., 63
F. Supp. 881 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
"29 CODE Fm. REGs. § 541.1 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
1129 CODE FED: REGS. § 541.1 (Supp. 1938).
" WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:93 (1948).
"
2 WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:83 (1948).
" WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:93 (1948).
" Jones v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, 75 F. Supp. 86 (D. Md. 1947).
" Schmidt v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 148 F. 2d 294 (2d Cir. 1945).
"
9 WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:94 (1948).
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cases show the problems that arose from this point of view. In Walling
v. Morris,2 0 the United States Supreme Court said that if the suit had
been brought by the employee to collect for overtime rather than by the
Administrator to enjoin violation of the Act, the employee would not be
exempt in the absence of a showing in the record of the extent to which
the laborers under his direction devoted themselves to the type of work
performed by the employee in question. In this case, the record did
show that the employee devoted 25 per cent of his own time to nonexempt
activities. In Grant v. Bergdorf and Goodman Company,2 1 it was held
that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the nonexempt
hours were to be measured by a percentage of the particular employee's
workweek rather than by the workweek of those under his direction.
Another holding under old Section (f) was that the nature of the
work, and not necessarily performance of the same type work as the
subordinates, controlled in determining exemption. Thus the work of
editors of a newspaper, although not of the same type as that of the
reporters under their supervision, in that it consisted mainly of copy-
reading, was of a general nonexempt nature and therefore the editors
were not exempt.
22
It is to be remembered that the present regulations require that the
employee shall not devote more than 20 per cent of his own hours worked
in a workveek to nonexempt activities. It is also to be remembered that
exemptions from the coverage of the Act are to be strictly interpreted,23
and that the employer seeking to avoid payment of overtime has the
burden of proving that the employee is exempt. 24 This burden must be
met by establishing the exemption by a clear preponderance of the evi-
dence.2 5 Of course, the burden of establishing the existence and extent
of overtime is on the employee.
20
The real problem is in determining whether particular work of the
employee is exempt. As one court expressed it, the application is
"troublesome because actual experience teaches that the effective, thor-
ough, conscientious executive or administrator frequently lends his own
hands, in addition to the words of advice..., as he teaches and instructs
those for whose work he is responsible, and whose work he desires to
press to a speedy and accurate conclusion. ' 27 Granting that this is an
20332 U. S. 422 (1947). 21172 F. 2d 109 (2d Cir. 1949).
22 American Newspaper Guild v. Republican Ptublishing Co., 271 App. Div. 1026,
68 N. Y. S. 2d 906 (2d Dep't 1947).2:A. H. Phillips, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490 (1945).
rWood Lumber Co. v. Tobin, 199 F. 2d 455 (6th Cir. 1952); Richter v.
Barrett, 173 F. 2d 320 (3d Cir. 1949); Abram v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 49
F. Supp. 393 (S. D. Cal. 1943). Contra: Zaetz v. General Instrument Corp., 21
N. J. Misc. 76, 30 A. 2d 504 (1943).
2 Walling v. Newman, 61 F. Supp. 971 (D. Iowa 1945).0 Rankin v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 1 (D. N. J. 1951).
27 Marian v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 18, 19 (N. D. Tex. 1946).
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accurate statement of the general situation, the courts are nevertheless
in disagreement as to whether the exemption should be whittled away
where the executive employee steps in to help. Another court noted,
"It is an American characteristic of the relationship of executive and
those under him that the foreman might 'pitch in' almost any time to
help. He would be the exception if he didn't."28  The court then held
such an employee to be an executive. However, still another court said
of an employee that "he is a good employee and pitches in and helps
whenever and wherever he is needed. The Administrator in adopting
his regulations intended to make an employee of this class subject to
the Act."29
At any rate, the regulations and cases have established as exempt
work certain types of manual work performed by executives. The
present regulations, in addition to exempting manual work which is
directly and closely related to the executive's managerial function, 30
specify two situations in which normally nonexempt work will be con-
sidered exempt because of its over-all relation to the executive duties of
the employee: (1) work done because of the existence of a real emer-
gency,31 and (2) infrequent or occasional tasks performed as a means
of properly carrying out management functions.32  These regulations
follow closely the rules set out by the Kentucky court in the leading
case, Mafizola v. Hardy-Burlingham Mining Company.33
In that case, the employee claimed certain time was nonexempt. In
this was included time he spent checking his men in and out of the mine
and getting together supplies such as time and report books, first aid
equipment, and safety devices. The court said it was apparent that those
duties were such as are performed by an executive employee and are
not manual labor or nonexempt work. The court further held that the
"executive's" teaching of first aid to his men was exempt work. More
important for our purposes, perhaps, was the court's holding that time
spent by the employee acting as a watchman during a strike was exempt.
The court said that "ordinarily a watchman's job is nonexempt work,
yet when a strike is in progress and a foreman undertakes a watchman's
duties, he is performing such services in an executive capacity. In such
circumstances, it is only an executive employee who is not a member of
the union on strike who can be depended on to perform such duties."3 4
8 lougherty v. James Vernon Co., 74 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E. D. Mich. 1947).
2' Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 69 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S. D. Fla. 1947),
rev'd on other grounds, 336 U. S. 187 (1949).
2029 CODE FED. REGS. § 541.108 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
29 CODE FED. REGS. § 541.109 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
29 CODE FED. REGS. § 541.110 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
's306 Ky. 492, 207 S. W. 2d 769 (1947).
2" Id. at 497, 207 S. W. 2d at 771; accord, McReynolds v. Pocahontas, 192 F. 2d
301 (4th Cir. 1951).
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Another court observed before the present regulations were adopted
that "there are times when the executive will appear to the observer as
doing. manual work, when, as a matter of fact, he is merely making an
investigation or exercising his discretion in laying out work for his subor-
dinates."3 5 Work in keeping production and personnel records, inspect-
ing and testing work of the employees and making recommendations
following such inspections, and manual labor in demonstrations or emer-
gencies,30 is not work which is to be counted against the nonexempt
work tolerance.
In an interesting case which may mark the outer limits of exemption,
engineers, whose duties included making necessary repairs and spending
a small amount of their time cleaning and oiling machinery, in addition
to making constant observation and regular inspections, were held to be
exempt by the United States Supreme Court.3 7  Here, however, the
employees under their direction were firemen and coal passers and the
supervisory work was not of the same type as that of the subordinates.
The dissent attacked the sufficiency of the amount of discretion which the
engineers exercised rather than the type of work which they performed.
Several other circumstances have been considered by the courts in
determining whether the employee's work was exempt. One considera-
tion is whether the work which is claimed to be nonexempt was per-
formed as a part of the employee's duty, something which he was at least
expected to do, or whether it was done of the employee's own volition.38
Thus, the fact that the plaintiff's mechanical tasks were performed on
a voluntary basis was accorded some weight in one case.30 And where
the supervision and nianagement of a department was the employee's
primary duty, the North Carolina Supreme Court said that the duty was
uninterrupted "except where, as a matter of convenience, plaintiff as-
sisted in some work which was regularly in the routine of other em-
ployees." 40 However, where an employee owed his job to his ability to
make necessary adjustments and keep machinery in operation, his work
was nonexempt. 4
1
Another circumstance which has been considered is whether the
employee in a union plant is or is not a member of the union. In one
case, the Supreme Court took cognizance of the fact that the union bad
abandoned a long contested claim of the right to represent engineers at
" Corey v. Detroit Steel Corp., 52 F. Supp. 138 (E. D. Mich. 1943).
"6 Evans v. Continental Motors Corp., 105 F. Supp. 784 (E. D. Mich. 1952).
Walling v. General Industries, Co., 330 U. S. 545 (1947).
'
8 Evans v. Continental Motors Corp., 105 F. Supp. 784 (E. D. Mich. 1952).
See 29 CODE FEn. REGS. § 541.110 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
Pugh v. Lindsay, 206 F. 2d 43 (4th Cir. 1953).
40 Pye v. Atlantic Co., 223 N. C. 92, 96, 25 S. E. 2d 401, 403 (1943).
"'Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 69 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S. D. Fla. 1947),
rev'd on other grounds, 336 U. S. 187 (1949).
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the plant, thereby recognizing their supervisory status.42 Again, another
court said, in speaking of the nonunion head of the materials division of
a plant, that "under the ever watchful eyes of the shop stewards there
was little opportunity for [the employee] to carry parts by hand without
detection. ' 43 The court then held that the employee's nonexempt work
did not exceed the 20 per cent tolerance. It is not, however, reversible
error to refuse to receive testimony of union officials intended to show
labor's point of view with respect to classiiication in the industry gen-
erally, since it is the work of the particular employee that governs in
each individual case. 44
A third circumstance that the cases establish as important is whether
the employee claims to be an executive, or conversely, whether the em-
ployer recognizes the employee as nonexempt. One court was impressed
with the fact that both employee and employer told a union official that
the employee was a foreman when the official complained because the
employee had cut some hoods for parkas.45 In another case, the employee
was paid overtime for continuing to do the same type work after the
disputed period in which no overtime was paid. The court said that this
was consistent with a recognition by the employer that the employee
was not an executive. 4 6
The courts have generally had little trouble in deciding whether the
20 per cent tolerance has been exceeded, once they have decided which
work is exempt and which is not. Perhaps the extreme case segregating
exempt from nonexempt working time is Kaczanowski v. Home State
Bank.47 There the plaintiff-employee of the bank spent part of her time
in the teller's cage, in addition to carrying out her primary duty of
approving mortgages and loans. If the entire time that the employee
was supposed to be in the teller's cage had been considered, this time
would have exceeded the 20 per cent limitation in the Administrator's
regulations. The court said that the frequent interruptions which took
the plaintiff away from the cage to carry out her supervisory functions
made her total non-executive hours much less than 20 per cent.
Both the regulations in effect from 1940 to 1950 and those in effect
at the present time have made specific exceptions to the limit on non-
exempt work. The present regulations except from Section (e) two
classes of workers: (1) employees who are in sole charge of an inde-
pendent branch establishment, or a physically separated branch establish-
ment, and, (2) employees who own at least a 20 per cent interest in the
," Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U. S. 545 (1947).
"3 Evans v. Continental Motors Corp., 105 F. Supp. 784, 788 (E. D. Mich. 1952).
" Gill v. Mesta Machine Co., 165 F. 2d 785 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334
U. S. 832 (1948).
" Kupperman v. M. & J. Becker, Inc., 198 F. 2d 765 (2d Cir. 1952).
40 Sawyer v. Selig Mfg. Co., 74 F. Supp. 319 (D. Mass. 1947).
'177 F. Supp. 602 (E. D.- Wisc. 1948).
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enterprise by which they are employed.48  The exception which relates
to part owners was not included in the old regulations. 4 There seems
to have been little litigation involving these exceptions.
The new requirement relating to nonexempt work differs from that
in the 1940-1950 regulations in the following ways:
1. The ceiling on the time which may be devoted to nonexempt
work is now measured by 20 per cent of the employee's own
time rather than by the weekly hours of the employees under
his direction.
2. Nonexempt work is now defined as work which is not "directly
and closely related" to the exempt duties, rather than "work
of the same nature" as that performed by the subordinates.60
While these changes may permit an employee to keep himself from
becoming an "executive" by performance of more nonexempt duties, as
was feared in the Stein Report of 1940,51 the scope of exempt work has
probably been broadened in that an employee may now perform certain
menial tasks which, because of their relation to his entire employment,
will not be counted against the nonexempt work tolerance.5 2
The Administrator's new definition includes a "streamlined" exemp-
tion for employees who are paid $100 weekly or more.53  Of these em-
ployees, the Administrator, after setting down certain requirements
which do not mention nonexempt work at all, says that they "shall be
deemed to meet all of the requirements" 54 of the definition of an execu-
tive. This would seem to indicate that as to these employees there is no
limit, except perhaps reasonableness, on the amount of nonexempt work
they may perform without losing their exempt status.
It must be remembered that the problem of whether a particular
employee is a "bona fide executive" does not arise until it has first been
determined that he is an employee. In one recent case, the plaintiff was
held not to be an employee within the meaning of the act when it ap-
peared that while he worked for the defendant corporation as a pattern
maker, or as a machinist at a specified hourly rate, he was also an officer,
a stockholder, and a director of the corporation.r5 Of course, the court
"29 CODE FED. RFas. § 541.1 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
,0 Editorial Analysis, WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:403 (1950). For
examples of employees in sole charge of physically separated branch, see Gruen-
stein v. Brust Footwear Corp., 72 F. Supp. 485 (E. D. Pa. 1947) ; Antis v. Mont-
gomery-Ward Co., 63 F. Supp. 669 (E. D. Mich. 1946).
"Editorial Analysis, WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:402 (1950).
"WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:83 (1948).
WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:402 (1950).
"Levitt, The "New" Wage and Hour Law, N. Y. U. THIRD ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR 269 (1950).
" 29 CODE FED. REGs. § 541.100 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
"Hoy v. Progress Pattern Co., 121 F. Supp. 371 (E. D. Mich. 1953).
[Vol. 33
1954]
did not discuss the exception relating to part owners provided in Sec-
tion (e) of the regulations since the plaintiff was not even an employee.
In spite of the clear and helpful regulations supplementing the defi-
nition of a "bona fide executive" employee, it remains difficult to draw
a line with all true executives falling on one side and all remaining
employees falling on the other. All of the requirements of the Adminis-
trator's definition must be met. The requirement that will probably
continue to be most troublesome deals with nonexempt work tolerance.
The courts must still decide on the particular facts of each case whether
work is "directly and closely related," and, if it is not, then whether the
amount of that work exceeds the tolerance.
F. KENT BURNS
Real Property-Personal Restrictive Building Covenants
Although the case of Julian v. Lawton' presented for decision a very
narrow question on the matter of restrictive building covenants and
perhaps turned on an agency question as much as on the construction
of the covenant involved, the case is of interest because of the growth of
residential subdivisions in the last two decades and the almost universal
inclusion of certain restrictions imposed by means of covenants in the
deeds given for the lots in these developments.2 In this case the use
of the term "personal" as applied to a valid restrictive building covenant
is believed to be unique.
In the principal case, the grantor, in conveying certain lands in a
real estate subdivision which he was promoting, inserted in the deeds
certain restrictive covenants one of which stated "that no dwelling house
or other building shall be erected on the tract until the type and exterior
lines of the building to be erected shall have been approved by [the
grantor] or by an architect selected by him .... ,,3 The court held that
the covenant was personal to the grantor and that both the restriction
and the agency of the architect ceased to be effective at the death of the
grantor.
By definition, "a real covenant is one having for its object something
annexed to, inherent in or connected with land or other real property" ;4
it is a covenant that is said to "touch and concern" the land.5 These
1240 N. C. 436, 82 S. E. 2d 210 (1954).
"'The number of decisions in comparatively recent years involving the validity,
construction and effect of agreements restricting the use of real property indicate
the increasing use being made of them. This reflects, it has been aptly commented,
the expansion of the law to meet the demands of home owners for a protection
adequate to the more crowded conditions of modem life." TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL
PRoPEarY §858 (3rd ed. 1939).
'Julian v. Lawt6n, 240 N. C. 436, 437; 82 S. E. 2d 210, 211 (1954).
'14 Am. JuR., Covenants § 19, at p. 495 (1938); 21 C. J. S., Covenants § 22
(1940).5 TIFFANY, LAW OF RF.AL PROPERTY § 854; at p. 455 (3rd ed. 1939).
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covenants "run with the land" and are enforceable for the duration of
the estate without regard to the personalities involved in any specific
transfer or sale.6 Personal covenants are between individuals, binding
only the covenantor and enforceable by the covenantee; their duration is
said to be only the life of the covenantee.7
The North Carolina Supreme Court has denominated as real cove-
nants the following: covenant of quiet enjoyment, covenant of warranty,8
covenant securing a right of way with an annual payment, covenant
that an existing canal shall be maintained, 10 covenant to build and main-
tain a stairway," and a covenant for a railroad to maintain a flag sta-
tion.1 2 The court has also included in this category covenants containing
building and occupancy restrictions such as: those limiting the number
of residences per tract; limiting ownership to members of the "white
race"; forbidding factories, manufacturing establishments, commercial
endeavors, tenements, apartment houses, saloons, sanatoriums, hos-
pitals; requiring a certain minimum cost per dwelling; requiring houses
a certain distance from a road or street; prohibiting the keeping of cer-
tain animals, and other like restrictions.13
Personal covenants in North Carolina cover such agreements as
covenants of seisin, 14 covenants against encumbrances, 15 and, where no
o 14 AM. JuR., Covenants § 19 (1938); 21 C. J. S., Covenants §§ 54, 74 (1940).
14 Am. JuR., Covenants § 27 (1938); TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 854
(3rd ed., 1939).
' "The covenant for quiet enjoyment and the covenant for warranty are in their
effect the same . . . in some cases the courts have noted minor distinctions between
them . . . they are generally regarded as substantially equivalent or identical in
operation and effect." AmERIcAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 12.129 (1952) ; quiet
enjoyment: Wiggins v. Pender, 132 N. C. 628, 44 S. E. 362 (1903) ; Markland v.
Crump, 18 N. C. 94, 27 Am. Dec. 320 (1834); warranty; Wiggins v. Pender,
supra; Ravenel v. Ingram, 131 N. C. 549, 42 S. E. 967 (1902); RAWLE, COVENANTS
FOR TiaTE § 213 (5th ed. 1887) ; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1022 (3rd ed. 1939).
Cf., Smith v. Ingram, 130 N. C. 100, 40 S. E. 984 (1902).
Raby v. Reeves, 112.N. C. 688, 16 S. E. 760 (1893).
10 Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N. C. 1 (1870).
Ring v. Mayberry, 168 N. C. 563, 84 S. E. 846 (1915).
1 Parrott v. Railroad, 165 N. C. 295, 81 S. E. 348 (1914).
13 These citations are representative only and do not in each specific case hold
the covenant to be real: residences per tract: Stroupe v. Medernach, 196 N. C.
305, 145 S. E. 925 (1928); Charlotte Consol. Construction Co. v. Cobb, 195 N. C.
690, 143 S. E. 522 (1928); "white race": Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co.,
226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710 (1945); Stroupe v. Medernach, supra; factories,
tenements, hospitals, etc.: Huffman v. Johnson, 236 N. C. 225, 72 S. E. 2d 236(1952) ; Bailey v. Jackson, 191 N. C. 61, 131 S. E. 567 (1925); minimum cost:
Pepper v. West End Development Co., 211 N. C. 166, 189 S. E. 628 (1936);
Huntington v. Dennis, 195 N. C. 759, 143 S. E. 521 (1928). These and other
restrictions received approval by reference in Johnson v. Garrett, 190 N. C. 835,
130 S. E. 835 (1925), one of the "Myers Park cases." For earlier cases on this
planned development, see: Myers Park Homes Co. v. Falls, 184 N. C. 426, 115
S. E. 184 (1922) ; and Stephens Co., v. Myers Park Homes Co., 181 N. C. 335,
107 S. E. 233 (1921). See TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 859.
"' Newbern v. Hinton, 190 N. C. 108, 129 S. E. 181 (1925); Eames v. Arm-
strong, 146 N. C. 1, 59 S. E. 165 (1907) ; Ravenal v. Ingram, 131 N. C. 549, 42
S. E. 967 (1902) ; AmERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 12.127 (1952) ; RAWLE,
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scheme or plan for development was present, certain other covenants
concerning the use of land 6 and Negro occupation.17
In other jurisdictions, the search for unenforced covenants similar
to the principal case has revealed covenants requiring a lightwell to be
left between buildings,' 8 prohibiting a grocery business on the land,' 9
forbidding manufacturing on the premises, 20 restricting location and
character of improvements to be made,2' and requiring a certain set back
distance for all buildings.2 2 All of these were considered personal and
each lacked either similar restrictions in the deeds for other lots in the
development or a scheme of development, both of which were present in
the principal case.
Still another case23 reveals a covenant prohibiting a mercantile busi-
ness from being conducted on the property. The court here refused to
enforce the covenant after the grantors had disposed of their nearby
mercantile business. The restriction was considered personal to protect
the grantor's business and served no purpose after the sale.
The combination of (1) a building restriction, (2) an area developed
according to a "scheme," and (3) a refusal to enforce because the
covenant was personal has not been found outside the principal case.
As seen above, cases may have all but one of the features of Julian v.
Lawton.
The case would seem to be well decided and in line with the prevailing
American law on personal covenants.2 4  Certainly little argument can
be given the court on its decision that the covenant was personal, prin-
cipally because of the use of words in the deed indicating that the grantor
as an individual was to be satisfied. Such phrases used by the court as
"without existence or meaning apart from the brain of" the grantor,
and "his aesthetic sense," would seem a fair interpretation of the lan-
guage of the deeds. However, in view of the defense advancd by the
grantor's personal representative and heirs, it would seem safe to assume
that the covenant was expected to run after the grantor's death. The
op. cit. supra note 4, § 205; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 205.
15 Thompson v. Avery County, 216 N. C. 405, 5 S. E. 2d 146 (1939) ; Lockhart
v. Parker, 189 N. C. 138, 126 S. E. 313 (1924) ; AmERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY,§ 12.128 (1952) ; RAWLE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 212; TIFFANY, op. cit. sutpra note 4,§ 1022.
6 Craven County v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 237 N. C. 502, 75 S. E.
2d 620 (1953) ; Sheets v. Dillon, 221 N. C. 426, 20 S. E. 2d 344 (1942).
"
7 Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E. 496 (1930).18Heimburge v. State Guaranty Corp., 116 Cal. App. 380, 2 P. 2d 998 (1931).
" Shade v. O'Keeffe, 260 Mass. 180, 156 N. E. 867 (1927)."
10 Harrington v. Joyce, 316 Mass. 187, 55 N. E. 2d 30 (1944).
J1 jennings v. Baroff, 104 N. J. Eq. 132, 144 Atl. 717 (1929).
"Baker v. Henderson, 137 Tex. 266, 153 S. W. 2d 465 (1941).
"Allison v. Greear, 188 Va. 64, 49 S. E. 2d 279 (1948).
" 21 C. J. S. Covenants § 33 (1940).
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court has thus removed one of the restrictions found in every deed in
that particular real estate development.
Since more specific or definite language in the deeds25 and the use
of certain legal devices 26 can do much to clear up any doubt as to the
real or personal nature of a restrictive building covenant, it is possible
that in the future the careful draftsman can obviate the necessity for the
court's having to designate such a covenant as personal.
WILLIAM P. SKINNER, JR.
Torts-Animals--Liability of Owner for Trespass of
Dogs While Hunting
In a recent North Carolina decision,1 the court held that the owner
of dogs which had, damaged crops, fences, and cattle of plaintiff in the
course of fox' hunts, was liable in trespass for damage done, although
the hunter himself did not enter the plaintiff's property.
Plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining farms in Guilford County.
The defendant, during a period of three years preceding the action, kept
a pack of seven to ten foxhounds that he hunted across plaintiff's land
at frequent intervals, in spite of plaintiff's repeated protests. Plaintiff's
pasture lay between two creeks. The fox was wont to dash between the
creeks during the hunt, and when fatigued by this exercise would dash
in among the herd of cattle with the yelping pack in hot pursuit. Where-
upon, the cattle would stampede, tearing down partition fences, cutting
themselves on the barbed wire, and generally working themselves into
whatever is the bovine equivalent of advanced neurosis.
Generally, the owner of domestic animals which stray onto property
of another is liable in damages for their trespass.2
-" It is suggested that the following might be sufficient: "... shall have been
approved by the grantor or his successors in interest, or by an architect selected
by him or his successors in interest." Also, the subjective nature of the restriction
could be made objective by listing architectural types not desired, i.e., ranch,
modern, colonial, etc.
6 See Huntington Palisades P. 0. Corp. v. Metropolitan Finance Corp., 180 F.
2d 132 (9th Cir. 1950), wherein the covenant read: "No building or other structure
shall be erected or the erection thereof begun on said premises until the plans and
specifications thereof shall have been first presented to and approved in writing by
the Seller or by the property owners corporation, herein referred to, as to outward
appearance 'and design." The result desired by the grantor in the principal case
was accomplished here by means of the property owners' corporation which each
grantee joined by acceptance of the deed.
'Pegg v. Gray, 240 N. C. 548, 82 S. E. 2d, 757 (1954).
2 E.g., Fox v. Koehnig, 190 Wis. 528, 209 N. W. 708 (1926); RESTATEMSNT,
TORTs § 504 (1934) ; HALSBuRY's LAws, Animals § 935 (2d ed. 1931) ; 3 C. J. S.,
Animals § 185 (1936) ; Accordingly, owners have been held strictly liable for the
trespasses of their turkeys: McPherson v. James, 69 Il. App. 337 (1896) ; Tate v.
Ogg, 170 Va. 95, 195 S. E. 496 (1938). And their chickens: Adams Bros. v. Clark,
189 Ky. 279, 224 S. W. 1046 (1920). Trespassing cattle, sheep, goats, horses,
mules, oxen, and swine are governed in practically all jurisdictions by detailed
statutes, which determine "legal fences," liability for trespass, local option as to
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The dog however is sui generis at law.3 And often "dog law is as
hard to define as dog latin." At early common law it was said: "there
is a difference between a dog and other animals: if a dog comes on your
land, you have no action." 5 This has evolved into the-doctrine at com-
mon law that the owner is not liable for his dog's trespass of its own
"volition." 6  This seems to have developed in recognition of: (1) the
fact that the dog is generally well disposed toward man; (2) the unlike-
lihood of a dog's causing serious damage to another's property as would,
for example, cows or sheep; and (3) the status of the dog at common
law as a base animal in which the owner had only a qualified, or accord-
ing to some commentators, no property right.7
This rule of non-liability for trespasses of the dog's own volition has
been criticized,8 and modified by statute in some jurisdictions.9 But in
North Carolina and the majority of American jurisdictions the rule still
largely obtains.' 0
The dog owner may be held liable, however, if: (1) the dog has a
propensity toward committing the trespass complained of; and, (2) the
dog owner has or should have knowledge of that propensity. This re-
quirement of "scienter" is rather general in Anglo-American jurisdic-
tions at common law," but has been modified or abolished by statute in
"stock laws," etc.: e.g., GA. CODE § 62-5 (1949) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 68-1 et seq.
(1950) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §3-5-79 (1949) ; VA. CODE § 8-874 (1950).3Sabin v. Smith, 26 Cal. App. 676, 147 Pac. 1180 (1915) ; Meekin v. Simpson,
176 N. C. 130, 96 S. E. 894 (1918); Dog Owner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Hilleboe, 124
N. Y. S. 2d 835, 839 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ; 2 Am. Jtu., Animals § 105 (1936).
' Citizen's Rapid-Transit Co. v. Dew, 100 Tenn. 317, 324, 45 S. W. 790, 791
(1890).
'Littleton, J., in Mitten v. Faudrye, 1 Poph. 161, 79 Eng. Rep. 1259 (1626),
"ct est un difference inter unchien et auters avers: si un chien vaer en votre terre
navares action." Accord, Anon. 1 Dyer 29a, 73 Eng. Rep. 64 (1537).
'Mitten v. Faudrye, supra note 5; See Pegg v. Gray, 240 N. C. 548, 82 S. E. 2d
757 (1954) ; Baker v. Howard County Hunt, 171 Md. 159, 188 Atl. 223 (1936) ;
Manton v. Brocklebank, [1921] 2 K. B. 212 (C. A.); see HALSBURY'S LAWS, Ani-
nals § 1313 (1931) ; cf. Buckle v. Holmes, [1926] 2 K. B. 125, 54 A. L. 1R 89
(cats).
" "Base" animals are those in which a right of property can be acquired by
reclaiming them from wildness. Once so "reclaimed," the common law recognized
them as possible subjects of larceny. O'Connell v. Jarvis, 13 App. Div. 3, 43 N. Y.
Supp. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1897) ; Pegg v. Gray, 240 N. C. 548, 82 S. E. 2d 757 (1954) ;
Bruch v. Rissmiller, 18 Pa. Dist. 732 (1909) ; Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 332, 1
Ld. Raym. 606 (1691).
" E.g., McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair and Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104
Pac. 1015 (1909).
' MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 140, § 155 (1949) ; OItlo GEN. CODE ANN. § 5838 (1945)
See Note, 142 A.L.R. 436 (1943).
" E.g., Pegg v. Gray, supra note 7; Banks v. Maxwell, 205 N. C. 233, 171 S. E.
70 (1933) ; cf. State v. Smith, 156 N. C. 628, 72 S. E. 321 (1911). But cf. N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 67-12 (1950) (liability of owner for dogs running free at nighttime).
"1 See, e.g., Owen v. Hampson, 258 Ala. 228, 62 So. 2d 245 (1952) ; Hagen v.
Laursen, 263 P. 2d 489 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App., 3d Dist. 1953) ; True v. Shelton, 314
Ky. 446, 235 S. W. 2d 1009 (1951) ; Perkins v. Drury, 57 N. M. 269, 258 P. 2d
379 (1953); Hill v. Palms, 237 S. W. 2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); See Note,
107 A. L. R. 1323 (1936).
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England12 and in some states.'3
So also may the owner of the dog be held liable if he himself is a
trespasser at the time of the dog's depredations.' 4
The instant case however poses problems in some respects unique in
this jurisdiction, and possibly in the body of the law. The owner of
the dogs did not himself trespass on plaintiff's land, as in some cases
cited by the court in its decision.15 However, the owner did have knowl-
edge of his dogs' trespasses and was advertent to their tendency to fol-
low the fox, and the fox's tendency to lead the pack across plaintiff's
land. This fact would have fulfilled the general rule of liability-if-there-
is-scienter (i.e., that the owner is liable if he has foreknowledge, actual
or imputed, of his dog's tendency toward a particular depredation), had
the court chosen to base its decision thereon.' 6
But the court in this case declared that the rule is different where
" Dogs Act 1906, 6 EDw. VII, c. 32, § 1; Dogs Act Amendment 1928, 18 AND
19 GEo. V, c. 21, § 1. (1).
'E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3404 (1949); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 767.01 (1943);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §347.22 (West 1947); N. J. STAT. ANN. §4:19-7 (1939);
OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 5838 (1945) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3 §§ 478, 481, 484, 485-
491 (1930); Wis. STAT. § 174.02 (1949). See dissent by Ryan, C. J., in Chunot
v. Larson, 43 Wis. 536 (1878). See Notes, 1 A. L. R. 1113 (1919) and 142 A. L. R.
436 (1943). Compare N. C. GEN. STAT. § 67-1 (1950) (Liability of dog owner
for injury to livestock or fowl. Although enacted in 1911, this statute has not yet
come before the North Carolina Supreme Court.); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 67-12
(1950) (liability for dogs running free at night).
14 Green v. Doyle, 21 Ill. App. 205 (1886) ; Beckwith v. Shordike, 4 Burr. 2092,
98 Eng. Rep. 91 (1767) ; Regina v. Pratt, 4 E. & B. 860, 119 Eng. Rep. 319 (1855)
(Where owner sent dog into cover, himself remaining on highway. Lord Campbell,
C. J., found owner a trespasser with his dog and therefore liable since "the soil
and freehold of the highway must be considered to be in the owner of the adjoining
land. The public have only an easement over it-a right to use it as a highway-
but the grass which grows on it is his."). WnLLIAMs, LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS
135 (Cambridge, 1939).
1 Baker v. Howard County Hunt, 171 Md. 159, 188 Atl. 223 (1936). From
the facts here the court would have been warranted in finding that the horses and
riders as well as the dogs trespassed. The theory of the Baker case also differs
from the instant case. The Baker case was an injunction proceeding on a nuisance
theory. Paul v. Summerhayes, 4 Q. B. D. 9, 39 L. T. 574 (1878). Here, de-
fendants in hot pursuit of fox rode onto plaintiff's land. Plaintiff in trying to put
them off was assaulted by defendants. The presence of dogs had no bearing on the
outcome of this case. Earl of Essex v. Capel, Cnrrr oN GAME LAws, 31 n. (2nd
ed. 1826). In this case, reported at Hertford Summer Assizes, 1809, defendant
admitted breaking and entering the close with other hunters, but stated that this
was the only way to kill the fox. As authority for the right to enter the close
in hot pursuit, he posited Gundry v. Felton, 1 T. R. 334, Y. B. 12 Hen. VIII, pl. 9
(1521). Lord Ellenborough stated, "Even if an animal may be pursued with dogs,
it does not follow that fifty or sixty people have, therefore, a right to follow the
dogs and trespass on other people's lands. . . ." (Do these words indicate that he
assumed that dogs may trespass in the course of a hunt?) Beckwith v. Shordike,
4 Burr. 2092, 98 Eng. Rep. 91 (1767). Here defendant trespassed with his dogs
on plaintiff's close. In spite of defendant's efforts to restrain them, the dogs killed
plaintiff's deer. Defendant was found liable since he himself trespassed.
1" The evidence disclosed that on one occasion when plaintiff protested that the
dogs were disturbing and injuring his cattle, the defendant replied, "They (the
dogs) are not damaging your cattle. If they kill one of them, I'll pay for it."
Pegg v. Gray, 240 N. C. 548, 550, 82 S. E. 2d 757, 758 (1954).
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the owner or keeper releases a dog or dogs for the purpose of sport,
knowing that they are likely to go on lands of others in pursuit of game.
The court's rule is stated thus: "In such cases ... the owner or keeper,
in the absence of permission to hunt previously obtained, is liable for
trespass, and this is so although the master does not himself go upon the
lands, but instead sends or allows his dog or dogs to go thereon in pur-
suit of game" (italics added).17 Although this rule is often stated, there
seem to be no direct holdings to that effect.18
This case, then, seems to be the first in which the question of an
owner's liability for the trespass of dogs in the course of a hunt unaccom-
panied by their owner is presented squarely to a court.
There can hardly be any dispute over the essential justice of the
North Carolina court's decision in this case, succinctly stated by Johnson,
J., that: "fox hunting as ordinarily pursued . . . is pure sport to be
followed in subordination to established property rights and subject to
the principles governing the law of trespass."'19
Sed quaere whether this same end might have been reached with
better authority20 by deciding that, the requirement of scienter of the
dogs' depredations having been fulfilled,2 ' the owner was liable for their
17 Id. at 551, 82 S. E. 2d at 759.
"I See HALSBURY'S LAWS, Game § 800 (1934), which states, "The entry need
not be personal in order to be actionable ... the sending of a dog onto ... land
in pursuit of game [is actionable]," and cites the following cases: Read v. Ed-
wards, 17 C. B. N. S. 245, 144 Eng. Rep. 99 (1864), (where the court decided on
basis of owner's scienter of dog's propensity to chase and destroy game, and spe-
cifically refused to decide question of owner's liability for every trespass) ; Regina
v. Pratt, 4 E. & B. 860, 119 Eng. Rep. 319 (1855) (see statement of facts in note
14 supra) ; Brown v. Giles, 1 Car. & P. 118, 171 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1823) (De-
fendant's dog jumped voluntarily into plaintiff's field. Court found this not only
not a wilful trespass, but no trespass at all. Damages of one farthing awarded
against defendant because of subsequent personal trespass.) ; Dimmock v. Allenby,
2 Marsh. 852 (1810) (where defendant had permission to hunt on righthand side
of the road, but his dog crossed oVer onto lefthand side; court directed jury to
find for defendant if the dog escaped against his will, and defendant had no in-
tention of hunting on the other side; WILLIAMtS, LIABILITY FOR ANiMALS 340(Cambridge 1939), which states, "it is a trespass to land to send a dog into a
cover to drive out game," and cites as authority Regina v. Pratt, 4 E. & B. 860,
119 Eng. Rep. 319 (1855), where in fact the owner as well as his dog was tres-
passing-see note 14 supra.
Pegg v. Gray, 240 N. C. 548, 555, 82 S. E. 2d 759, 762 (1954).
" E.g., Owen v. Hampson, 258 Ala. 228, 62 So. 2d 245 (1952); Hagen v.
Laursen, 263 P. 2d 489 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App., 3d Dist. 1953) ; True v. Shelton,
314 Ky. 446, 235 S. W. 2d 1009 (1951) ; Bachman v. Clark, 128 Md. 245, 97 At.
440 (1916) ; Statter v. McArthur, 33 Mo. App. 218 (1888) ; Banks v. Maxwell, 205
N. C. 233, 171 S. E. 70 (1933) ; State v. Smith, 156 N. C. 628, 72 S. E. 321, 36
L. R. A. (N. S.) 910 (1911) ; Bruch v. Rissmiller, 18 Pa. Dist. 732 (1909) ; Hill
v. Palms, 237 S. W. 2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; see cases cited Note 14 supra;
Manton v. Brocklebank, f1923] 2 K. B. 212 (C. A.); Read v. Edwards, 17
C. B. N. S. 245, 14 Eng. Rep. 99 (1864) ; see Saunders v. Teape, 51 L. T. N. S.
263, 264 (1884) ; Pnossaa, TORTS, § 57 at p. 438 (1941). But see 17 TULANE L.
REV. 138 (1942) (contrasting development of Louisiana statute with common law
doctrine of scienter.).
"1 See Note 16 supra.
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damages, rather than basing the decision on a trespass theory, which
may later prove troublesome.
The court's rule, finally, seems to contemplate the pink-coated,
mounted foxhunt of the English squire rather than the nocturnal and
sedentary hunt of his North Carolina cousin. It appears, as many of
the English decisions, to be based on the probability of the hunter being
near enough to his hounds to control their trespasses during the hunt.
2 2
Quaere whether this rule will in effect harness the fox, 'possum, or
'coon hunter to a strict liability for trespasses of dogs, while hunting,
which in actuality are quite as beyond his control as when ranging "on
their own volition. 23
HAMILTON C. HORTON, JR.
Torts-Last Clear Chance-Contributory Negligence as a
Matter of Law
In a recent wrongful death action1 plaintiff's intestate was adjudged
contributorily negligent as a matter of law when he failed to notice the
approach of a detached coal car which he could have seen for a quarter
of a mile, had he but looked. The court nonsuited the plaintiff, re-
fusing to submit the issue of last clear chance to the jury. On appeal
Justice Parker first pointed out that the doctrine had not been pleaded,
nor had any evidence been advanced in support of the doctrine. He then
added that "this doctrine [of last clear chance] does not apply when the
contributory negligence of the party injured, as a matter of law, bars
recovery.' 2
This last statement has begun to make frequent appearances in the
North Carolina law of. negligence. What then is the legal meaning of
this phrase, as used in this context?
The doctrine of last clear chance supposedly sprang from the famous
"hobbled ass" case of Davies v. Mann.3 It was a reaction against the
'
2 For an excellent introduction to English fox hunting, see 11 ENcY. BRIT-
TANicA, Hunting (14th ed., 1932). Here the factor of control is real, being accom-
plished by horn and "whipper in." In North Carolina, however, in the typical
foxhunt, of which the instant case is an example, (see complaint, Record on Ap-
peal, p. 2) the hounds are released at night and generally run at will, the "hunts-
men" often seating themselves beside jug and fire, enjoying with liquid conviviality
the cry of the hounds. Often the hunt takes all night-until either fox or hounds
are too exhausted to continue. Tar Heels still tell of an all night hunt when the
first rays of dawn saw five of the hounds walking painfully down the road-with
the fox, equally tired, just a few feet ahead-also walking.
"' The actualities of the average Southern foxhunt seem to have been recognized
by Virginia in VA. CODE § 29-213 (1950), which allows permits to be issued to
allow foxhounds to run at large and without their master.
' Wagoner v. N. C. R. R. and Southern R. R., 238 N. C. 162, 77 S. E. 2d 701
(1953).
*Id. at 174, 77 S. E. 2d at 710.
*152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
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harshness of the contributory negligence rule,4 and began to show up
clearly in North Carolina law about 1881. 5 Perhaps the best modern
statement of the North Carolina doctrine can be found in Ingram v.
Smoky Mtn. Stages, Inc.:
"The contributory negligence of the plaintiff does not pre-
clude a recovery where it is made to appear that defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided the
injurious consequences to plaintiff, notwithstanding plaintiff's
negligence; that is, that by the exercise of reasonable care defend-
ant might have discovered the perilous position of the party in-
jured or killed and have avoided the injury, but failed to do so." 6
Thus stated, the North Carolina doctrine seems as sound and under-
standable as that of any other jurisdiction, but in its recent tendency to
rely on "contributory negligence as a matter of law" as grounds for
refusing to submit the last clear chance issue to the jury, the North
Carolina court's position is as unique as it is baffling.
Apparently this idea was first expressed in the case of Redmon v.
Southern R. R.7  In listing certain "principles" applicable to last clear
chance cases, the court (per Justice Brogden) first pointed out that con-
tributory negligence on the plaintiff's part was a prerequisite to any
consideration of the last clear chance doctrine,8 and then, in the same
breath, said that a certain kind of contributory negligence-contributory
negligence "as a matter of law"-would preclude the application of the
doctrine.
However confusing and contradictory this may seem, it now appears
to be the law in North Carolina. The question which immediately arises
in the mind of the practicing attorney is, at what point does mere con-
tributory negligence become contributory negligence as a matter of law,
which bars the submission to the jury of the issue of last clear chance?
Justice Brogden, in the Redmon. opinion, cited many cases in support
of this surprising theory.9 Yet they hardly seem to be in point, for in
' PROSsER, TORTS § 54 (1941).
Gunter v. Wicker, 85 N. C. 310 (1881).8225 N. C. 444, 447, 35 S. E. 2d 337, 339 (1945).
195 N. C. 764, 143 S. E. 829 (1928).
' For a recent reiteration of this position see Graham v. Atl. Coast Line R. R.,
240 N. C. 338, 82 S. E. 2d 346 (1954), in which reference is made to the "doc-
trine of last clear chance, which presupposes both negligence and contributory
negligence ......
Cooper v. N. C. R. R., 140 N. -C. 209, 52 S. E. 932 (1905) ; Mitchell v. Sea-
board Airline Ry., 153 N. C. 116, 68 S. E. 1059 (1910); Coleman v. Atl. Coast
Line R. R., 153 N. C. 322, 69 S. E. 129 (1910) ; Davidson v. Seaboard Airline Ry.,
171 N. C. 634, 88 S. E. 759 (1916) ; Holton v. Kinston-Carolina R. R., 188 N. C.
277, 124 S. E. 307 (1924); McCulloch v. N. C. R. R., 188 N. C. 797, 125 S. E. 529
(1924) ; Elder v. Plaza R. R., 194 N. C. 617, 140 S. E. 298 (1927) ; Harrison v.
N. C. R. R., 194 N. C. 656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927) ; Pope v. At. Coast Line R. R.,
195 N. C. 67, 141 S. E. 350 (1928).
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only two of them was the issue of last clear chance even raised,' 0 and
in not a single one does it appear that the court refused to allow applica-
cation of last clear chance because plaintiff had been guilty of "con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law."'1 But if there was no precedent
for the court's decision, there certainly have been a number of cases
following it with approval.12
The court has never offered to define "contributory negligence as a
matter of law" when using it in this sense.' 3 But an examination of the
cases in which last clear chance has been ruled inapplicable on those
grounds may afford some clue as to the kind of conduct which the court
will call "contributory negligence as a matter of law."
In all of these cases plaintiff was guilty of what the court calls con-
tinuing negligence, that is, negligence which, if it did not come after that
of defendant, at least concurred with it in causing the accident. In Rives
v. Atl. Coastline R. R. the court said: "In the daytime on a clear day
he (plaintiff's intestate) was standing on a live track without looking
or taking any precautions for his own safety, and he stood there until a
fast passenger train snuffed out his life. Consequently he was guilty of
contributory negligence which continued to the moment of the impact.' 4
In Rimmer v. Southern R. R."5 the intestate was crossing a track holding
a cloak over her head for protection from the rain. Her attention was
centered on the traffic in the highway, and she was struck by a train
and killed. In Sherlin v. Southern R. R.10 plaintiff attempted to run
across a railroad trestle ahead of a speeding train when he could have
stood in safety on a "chat" jutting out from the trestle. In the Redmon
10 Davidson v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 171 N. C. 634, 88 S. E. 759 (1916) ; Elder
v. Plaza R. R., 194 N. C. 617, 140 S. E. 298 (1927).
" The following fact situation is typical of those in the cases cited in the
Redinon. decision: The injured party, apparently under no disability, walks or
drives directly into the path of an oncoming train. Without mentioning the doctrine
of last clear chance, the court nonsuits the plaintiff on the grounds that the injured
party was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. It is difficult to
understand how the court could cite these as involving last clear chance.
1" Rives v. Atl. Coast Line R. R., 203 N. C. 227, 165 S. E. 709 (1932); Rimmer
v. Southern R. R., 208 N. C. 198, 179 S. E. 753 (1935) ; Sherlin v. Southern R. R.,
214 N. C. 222, 198 S. E. 640 (1938) ; Ingram v. Smoky Mtn. Stages, Inc., 225
N. C. 444, 35 S. E. 2d 337 (1945) ; Dowdy v. Southern R. R., 237 N. C. 519, 75
S. E. 2d 639 (1953).
1" Violation of statute by the plaintiff is usually referred to by the court as
contributory negligence per se, or as a matter of law, but obviously this is not
what the court has reference to in these cases, for mere violation of statute would
not preclude the application of last clear chance where the defendant could, in the
exercise of due care, have avoided the accident.
1'203 N. C. 227, 229, 165 S. E. 709, 710 (1932).
' 208 N. C. 198, 179 S. E. 753 (1935).
10214 N. C. 222, 198 S. E. 640 (1938). As supporting cases the court in this
decision, cites (among others) Stover v. Southern R. R., 208 N. C. 495, 181 S, E.
336 (1935) and Lemmings v. Southern R. R., 211 N. C. 499, 191 S. E. 39 (1937).
No mention is made of "contributory negligence as a matter of law" in these cases,
but in both cases the court makes it clear that it is the continuing negligence of the
plaintiff, up to the moment of impact, which bars the application of last clear chance.
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case itself 7 and in cases cited there,' 8 it appears that the injured party
was guilty of negligence which continued up to the time of the accident.
It is also true that in these cases, starting with the Redmon case,
which have relied on a doctrine of contributory negligence as a matter
of law in refusing to apply the last clear chance doctrine, the injured
party was never in any apparent peril. Defendant (usually the train
engineer) had no reason to believe that plaintiff was not in full possession
of all his faculties.
The court, in Sherlin v. Southern R. R. said: "It appears that the
intestate was in the apparent possession of all his faculties, and there
was nothing to put the engineer on notice of any impairment in his hear-
ing, or that he would not step off the track to an existent place of safety
before the train hit him."' 9  In Ingram v. Smoky Mtn. Stages, Inc., it
was said: "There was nothing in the conduct of the deceased to indicate
to the bus driver that he was in a position of peril. °20 And in Dowdy v.
Southern R. R.: "There is no evidence that the engineer knew, or by the
exercise of due care, could have known, that Dowdy was helpless upon
the track-if, indeed, Dowdy was helpless. The defendant had a right
to assume up to the very moment of the collision that Dowdy would
extricate himself from danger."2
1
Often, of course, there have been other factors in these cases which
have influenced the court in nonsuiting the plaintiff. 22 But the conclu-
sion is irresistible that where the court denies plaintiff access to the
doctrine of last clear chance, saying, in explanation, that the injured
party has been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
either the injured party was guilty of (1) active, continuing contributory
.7 195 N. C. 764, 143 S. E. 829 (1928). Here plaintiff's intestate drove a truck
onto the railroad tracks, in full view of an oncoming train.
"s See note 7 for the cases cited in support of the Redion decision. In one of
these, McCulloch v. N. C. R. R., 188 N. C. 797, 799, 125 S. E. 529, 530 (1924), it
was said: "Recovery is denied . . . upon the ground that plaintiff's intestate was
guilty of contributory negligence, continuing up to and necessarily proximately
producing the injury."
10 214 N. C. 222, 224, 198 S. E. 640, 641 (1938). Cited in this case was Reep v.
Southern R. R., 210 N. C. 285, 286, 186 S. E. 318 (1936), in which the court said:
"There is no evidence that any disability of the intestate was known or was ap-
parent to the engineer. The engineer therefore had a right to assume up to the
last moment that the intestate would get off the track."
-20225 N. C. 444, 449, 35 S. E. 2d 337, 340 (1945).
!1237 N. C. 519, 527, 75 S. E. 2d 639, 644 (1953). In dissenting in this de-
cision, Johnson, J. pointed out the fallacy of the position that "contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law" will bar application of last clear chance. He said: "It
is stated in the majority opinion that the doctrine of last clear chance 'does not
apply when plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.' Con-
versely, may it not be said with equal force that one may not be adjudged contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law when the doctrine of last clear chance applies?"
Id. at 528, 75 S. E. 2d at 645.
"As, for instance the probability that defendant was too close to stop even if
he had discovered plaintiff's peril in time. See Ingram v. Smoky Mtn. Stages,
Inc., 225 N. C. 444, 35 S. E. 2d 337 (1945).
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negligence, or (2) he was never in any "apparent peril" or (3) both.
One may or may not agree with the wisdom and ultimate justice of
refusing to apply the last clear chance doctrine in these situations, but
one cannot deny that these rules are clearer and more tangible than the
blank statement that plaintiff as been guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law. Why, then, does the court insist upon using this
phrase, which explains nothing and succeeds only in creating an aura
of mystery about the entire decision?
This note does not purport to analyze trends in the North Carolina
law of negligence, but more exhaustive and general research might well
reveal that the confusion in this area heralds a general reaction against
the doctrine of last clear chance and a tendency on the part of the North
Carolina court to apply it more sparingly.
DAVID M. CLINARD
Torts-Liability of Golf Courses to Invitees
In a recent North Carolina case, the court moved a step closer to
defining the liability of a golf course for accidents which occur on its
premises.' In affirming the non suit granted by the lower court, the
court held that the defendant golf course was under no duty to guard
against possible injury to patrons by reason of the maintenance of the
water hole which caused the plaintiff's injury and that the plaintiff's
evidence clearly indicated that he was contributorily negligent, which
barred his recovery as a matter of law.2
In its discussion of the situation, the court placed the golf course in
the general category of places of amusement and the golfer in the general
category of invitee. As was correctly stated in the principal case, the
general rule is that the owner of a place of amusement "is not an insurer
of the safety of patrons, but owes them only what, under particular
circumstances, is 'ordinary' or 'reasonable' care."3
'Farfour v. Mimosa Golf Club et al., 240 N. C. 159, 81 S. E. 2d 375 (1954).
Plaintiff was playing golf on a course owned by defendants. After finishing the
ninth hole, he placed his caddie cart several feet away from a path leading to the
tenth tee. He drove his ball from the tee and returned to get his cart. After
getting the cart, he was injured when he stepped into an open terra cotta hole
which was used by the defendants in connection with watering the greens. The
hole was normally covered, and there was evidence to show that it had been un-
covered for 30 to 50 days prior to the accident. The court granted the defendant's
motion for non-suit.
2 Other jurisdictions have reached a similar result in similar situations by appli-
cation of the doctrine of assumption of risk. See: Young v. Roass, 127 N. J. L.
211, 21 A. 2d 762 (1941) ; Schlenger v. Weinberg, 107 N. J. L. 130, 150 Atl. 434(1930) ; Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club, 105 Wash. 215, 181 Pac. 679 (1919);
Note, 32 N. C. L. REv. 366 (1954).
' Farfour v. Mimosa Golf Club et al., 240 N. C. 159, 163, 81 S. E. 2d 375, 378(1954). See also: Boucher v. Paramount-Richards Theaters, 30 So. 2d 211 (La.
Ct. App. 1947) ; Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N. W. 2d 453 (1947) ;
Revis v. Orr, 234 N. C. 158, 66 S. E. 2d 652 (1952) ; Patterson v. City of Lexing-
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In quoting from an earlier case,4 the court gave this rule of liability:
"The owner of a place of entertainment is charged with an affirmative,
positive obligation to know that the premises are safe for the public use,
and to furnish adequate appliances for the prevention of injuries to be
anticipated from the nature of the performance, and he impliedly war-
rants the premises to be reasonably safe for the purpose for which they
are designed."5 This seems to be the accepted rule in North Carolina 6
as well as in other states.7
Although there have been several decided cases in North Carolina
dealing with injuries to golfers, there has been no definite statement by
the court as to what the legal rights of a golfer are in relation to the golf
course owner. According to this case and the Restatement of Torts,
8
it would seem that a fee-paying golfer playing on a golf course would
be a "business invitee" of the golf course. In relation to the distinction
between an "invitee" and a mere "licensee," it has been held that in
North Carolina, in order "to constitute one an invitee of the other, there
must be some mutuality of interest. Usually an invitation will be in-
ferred where the visit is -of interest or mutual advantage to the parties,
while a license will be inferred where the object is the mere pleasure or
benefit of the visitor."
9
In view of the fact that the business of a golf course is the playing
of golf and its chief source of revenue is derived from fees paid by play-
ing golfers, it is natural to conclude that the fee-paying golfer on the
premises is a "business invitee" of the golf course. His rights then would
be those normally due an invitee on the premises.' 0
ton, 229 N. C. 637, 50 S. E. 2d 900 (1949) ; Schentzel v. Philadelphia Nat. League
Club, 173 Pa. Super. 179, 96 A. 2d 181 (1953) ; Peck v. Stanley Co., 335 Pa. 608,
50 A. 2d 306 (1947) ; Whitfield v. Cox, 189 Va. 219, 52 S. E. 2d 72 (1949).
'Smith v. Cumberland Agricultural Society, 163 N. C. 346, 79 S. E. 632 (1913).
' Farfour v. Golf Club, 240 N. C. 159, 163, 81 S. E. 2d 375, 378 (1954).
' Drumwright v. North Carolina Theaters, 228 N. C. 325, 45 S. E. 2d 379
(1947) ; Ross v. Sterling Drug Store et al., 225 N. C. 226, 34 S. E. 2d 64 (1945) ;
Hiatt v. Ritter, 223 N. C. 262, 25 S. E. 2d 756 (1943) ; Bowden v. Kress, 198 N. C.
559, 152 S. E. 625 (1930) ; Smith v. Cumberland Agricultural Society, 163 N. C.
346, 79 S. E. 632 (1913).
' Boucher v. Paramount-Richards Theaters, 30 So. 2d 211 (La. Ct. App. 1947) ;
Rouillard v. Canadian Klondike Club, 316 Mass. 11, 54 N. E. 2d 680 (1944);
Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., 296 Mass. 168, 5 N. E. 2d 1
(1936); Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N. W. 2d 453 (1947);
McCullough v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 92, 12 N. W. 2d 639 (1944);
Henry v. Segal, 174 Pa. Super. 313, 101 A. 2d 149 (1953) ; Denton v. Third Avenue
Theater Co., 126 W. Va. 607, 29 S. E. 2d 353 (1944).
' RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 32 (1934): "A business visitor is a person who is
invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for a
purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between them."
' Pafford v. Jones Construction Co., 217 N. C. 730, 735, 9 S. E. 2d 408, 411
(1940); accord, Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Newton, 131 F. 2d 845 (4th Cir.
1942).
10 Anderson v. Reidsville Amusement Co., 213 N. C. 130, 195 S. E. 386 (1938).
Cf., Brooks v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 679 (E. D. N. C. 1951), affirined, 194
F. 2d 185 (4th Cir. 1952) ; McDonald v. Woolworth Co., 177 F. 2d 401 (4th Cir.
1954]
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However, the recorded cases where a golf course has been held re-
sponsible for accidents occurring on or about its land are few. In one
of these cases, the course was held liable for not enforcing safety regula-
tions on its premises, which negligence resulted in a player's being hit
by a ball driven by another player.1 In another situation, a motorist
on an adjoining road was injured as a result of a ball's being hit from
the golf course.1 2  This case was decided against the course because
the layout of the premises was such that it was a natural hazard of the
game that balls would be hit into the road. In two other cases which
involved defects in the premises, the courses were held liable because
of these defects. They involved a caddie suffering injuries when a small
bridge on which he was standing collapsed,13 and a boy receiving in-
juries when he accidentally touched a guy wire leading to an electric
power line.14
The principal case seems to be the first case on record, certainly,the
first one in North Carolina, "where a patron of a golf course has sued
to recover damages as a result of stepping into any kind of hole on or
about a golf course."' 5
However, in one Missouri case, the court held that a spectator at a
golf tournament could not recover for injuries sustained when she tripped
over a rock concealed by tall grass, in the absence of any showing that
the golf course had any previous knowledge of the protruding rock.' 0
1949) ; Hall v. Holland, 47 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1950) ; Price v. Taylor, 302 Ky. 736,
196 S. W. 2d 312 (1946) ; Revis v. Orr, 234 N. C. 158, 66 S. E. 2d 652 (1952);
Barron v. Fuel Co., 159 Pa. Super. 35, 46 A. 2d 506 (1946).
" Everett v. Goodwin and Starmount Golf Club Inc., 201 N. C. 734, 161 S. E.
316 (1931). Plaintiff was playing golf on the course owned by the defendant golf
course when he was struck by a ball driven by the defendant golfer who had failed
to give the customary warning of "fore." The Court held that the defendants
were jointly liable. Contra: Schlenger v. Weinberg, 107 N. 3. L. 130, 150 Atd. 434
(1930).
"' Gleason v. Hillcrest Golf Course, Inc., 148 N. Y. Misc. 246, 265 N. Y. Supp.
886 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1933). Plaintiff was riding in an automobile on a highway
adjoining the course operated by the defendant when a ball driven from the course
struck and shattered the windshield of the car, injuring the plaintiff. The golf
course was held liable. See also: Castle v. St. Augustine's Links, 38 T. L. R.
(K. B. 1922) 615.
3 Claremont County Club v. Industrial Accident Commission, 174 Cal. 395, 163
Pac. 209 (1917). A caddie leaned against the handrail of a bridge spanning a small
creek on the golf course owned by the country club. The rail gave away, and the
boy fell, sustaining a permanent injury to one of his elbows. The court held the
country club liable; accord, Low v. City of Gastonia, 211 N. C. 564, 191 S. E. 7
(1937).1 Texaco Country Club v. Wade, 163 S. W. 2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
The court held that a caddie who went to the defendant country club to seek em-
ployment in response to an invitation from the club manager and who placed his
hand on a guy wire extending from a light pole and received an electric shock
was an "invitee" and that the club was liable for his injuries.
1" Farfour v. Mimosa Golf Club et al., 240 N. C. 159, 162, 81 S. E. 2d 375, 378
(1954).




The court seemed to feel that the spectator here was not injured as a
result of any unusual danger on the golf course which she could not have
anticipated and for which she did not assume the risk. Also, there has
been one case in which a patron of an "obstade" golf course sued for
injuries resulting from a fall on a sloping fairway.17 The owner in this
case was not held liable, because this was the type of risk assumed by the
patron when he played the game. The Massachusetts court seemed to
rule that a patron assumed the risk in a case where the patron, who had
used a golf driving range five times previously, was struck by a ball
driven by a third person.18 All three of these situations are easily dis-
tinguishable from the principal case in that they do not involve accidents
to golfers playing on a regular golf course.
According to the general rules of law in regard to the liability of
occupiers of land to invitees on the premises, it would seem that the
occupier (in this situation the golf course) could be held liable for in-
juries sustained by the invitee (golfer) so long as the invitee is reason-
ably engaged in the furtherance of the business at hand-in this case,
playing golf.
The court found in the principal case that the place where the water
hole was located was "no part of the terrain designed for playing the
game of golf" ;19 therefore the defendants were under "no duty to antici-
pate that patrons would travel in the area of the water hole and to guard
against possible injury to them by reason of the hole." 20 By so finding,
the court, in effect, ruled that the invitee had gone beyond the range of
invitation and had become a mere licensee who had to take the premises
as he found them. Had not the court held that the plaintiff had gone
beyond the area of the invitation, it appears that the court would have
held that the golf course was under a duty to guard against possible
injury and, except for the element of contributory negligence, would
have been liable for the injuries sustained. This is certainly in accord
with the majority of the cases which deal with this problem.
However, this writer feels that the court's limitations of the playing
area were too restrictive in view of the nature of the game. Whether a
slight deviation for the purpose of placing a caddie cart out of the
golfer's way could be considered an act in the furtherance of the game
"'Young v. Roass, 127 N. J. L. 211, 21 A. 2d 762 (1941). Plaintiff went to an
"obstacle" golf course, paid admission fee and began playing. He was subse-
quently injured when he fell on the seventh fairway on which there was a slope
of six inches descending at a 45-degree angle. The court held that there was an
"assumption of risk" by the plaintiff and refused recovery for the injuries sustained.
"8 Katz v. Gow, 321 Mass. 666, 75 N. E. 2d 438 (1947).
"o Farfour v. Mimosa Golf Club et al., 240 N. C. 159, 165, 81 S. E. 2d 375, 380
(1954).20 Id. at 165, 81 S. E. 2d at 380.
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seems to be a question over which reasonable men might differ and
rightly a question for the jury.21
DONALD LEON MOORE
Torts-Libel in Will-Publication-Liability of Estate
Where a testator left ten dollars to his grandson and in the will
accused him of squandering one thousand dollars, of deserting his
mother and the testator by taking sides against him in a lawsuit, and of
shirking his duty in World War II, the Oregon Supreme Court held
that "an action will lie against the testator's estate for libelous matter
contained in a will published after the death of the testator."' This
decision, because of its rather clear logic, should help to swing the bal-
ance toward some degree of certainty in a field which, at the present
time, shows little uniformity of result. There are three other decisions
in this country in which the same result was reached as in the instant
case2 and three in which liability was denied.3
Two of the cases denying recovery do so on the theory that the com-
mon law maxim actio personalis moritur cur persona applies in these
21 In affirming the granting of the motion for non suit, the court felt that the
evidence was so clear that no other reasonable inference was deducible. Donlop v.
Snyder, 234 N. C. 627, 630, 68 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1951). Cf., Cox v. Railroad, 123
N. C. 604, 607, 31 S. E. 848, 850 (1898): "The plaintiff's evidence must .. .be
accepted as true, and construed in the light most favorable for him. . . . It is
well settled that if there is more than a scintilla of evidence tending to prove the
plaintiff's contention, it must be submitted to the jury, who alone can pass upon
the weight of the evidence." See also: Texaco Country Club v. Wade, 163 S. W.
2d 219, 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942): "The test of whether one on premises used
for public purposes is an invitee at the exact place of injury seems to be whether
the owner of the premises ought to have anticipated the member of the public at
this point on the premises devoted to public use. It is not essential that the owner
should have foreseen the precise injury to any particular individual, but merely
that some like injury might, and probably would, result to someone lawfully on
the premises.... The duty to keep premises safe for invitees does not necessarily
apply to the entire premises. It extends to all portions of the premises which are
included within the invitation, and which are necessary or convenient for the invitee
to use in the course of the business for which the invitation was extended, and at
which his presence should therefore reasonably be anticipated, or which he is
allowed to go." See, e.g., Heller v. Select Lake City Operating Co., 187 F. 2d
649 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Mulford v. Hotel Co., 213 N. C. 603, 197 S. E. 169 (1938) ;
Texas Public Service Co. v. Armstrong, 37 S. W. 2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
1Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686, 690 (Ore. 1954).
2 Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; In Matter
of Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (Orphan's Ct. 1901) ; Harris v. Nashville
Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1913).
'Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313
(1933), reversing Hendricks v. Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank, 43 Ga. App.
408, 158 S. E. 915 (1931); Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 Atl. 487 (1934);
Carver v. Morrow, 213 S. C. 199, 48 S. E. 2d 814 (1948). The Nagle case would
seem to overrule the decision allowing recovery in Gallagher's Estate, supra note
2, not by repudiating the basic theory of the lower court but by carrying the case
into the field of privilege.
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situations,4 but those finding liability hold that since the publication
complained of occurs after the testator's death, the right of action does
not arise until after his death, and, therefore, could not have expired
at the time the testator died, as contemplated by the maxim.5 But, the
finding that the maxim does not apply does not end the question, for
there are other problems which must be considered before the estate can
be held liable.
The question of whether the executor is the agent of the testator
sometimes causes trouble. The Oregon court held in the principal case
that there was no agency relationship before the death of the testator
between the testator and the executor and that, consequently, in offering
the will for probate the executor could not be acting as the agent of the
testator." Even under the agency theory different results are possible.
The Tennessee court holds that the executor is the agent of the testator
and the estate should be held liable,7 while the South Carolina court,
applying the rule that "agency terminates upon the death of the princi-
pal," holds that the estate is not liable.8
The best reasoning seems to be that of the Oregon court, which says
that the person publishing the will "is an instrumentality through which
the will is published, and when he does thus act he in effect publishes the
' Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, supra note 3; Carver v.
Morrow, supra note 3.
Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686 (Ore. 1954) ; In Matter of Gallagher's
Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733, 736 (Orphan's Ct. 1901): "No right of action existed
for the wrong alleged to have been done this claimant when Father Gallagher died;
for the will had not and could not have been published, and was, therefore, obviously
not within the letter of the rule."; Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573,
580, 162 S. W. 584, 586 (1913) : "So the tort upon which this suit is based was not
committed, until after the death of Woodfin. This right of action arose after Wood-
fin's death, and could not have been buried with him. The case therefore falls
without the letter of the old rule."
But see Note, Right of Recovery for Testamentary Libel, 27 HARv. L. Rxv. 666,
668 (1914), where the proposition is put forth that "if no tort is committed till
after death, there is then no tortfeasor to punish"-a legalistic bit of thought
which contemplates putting an end to the matter without contributing too much
to a sound analysis of the problem. See also Hegel v. George, 218 Wis. 327, 259
N. W. 862, 864 (1935), for an example of the type of case in which the logic used
in the principal case is employed to deny recovery in a wrongful death action.
Howe, plaintiff's intestate, was the driver of a car involved in a collision with a
car driven by George. George died a few hours before Howe. George was found
negligent. The statute declared that "actions for wrongful death survive the death
of the wrongdoer." The court held that, since the death of the wrongdoer preceded
the death of the plaintiff-decedent, "there was and is no cause of action." A simi-
lar case is Martinelli v. Burke, 298 Mass. 390, 10 N. E. 2d (1937) ; this case is the
subject of annotation in 112 A. L. R. 341 (1938).
' Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, supra note 5.
'Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 578-9, 162 S. W. 584, 585-6(1913) : "It is well settled that a principal is responsible when authority is given
to an agent to publish libelous words and a publication is made by the agent in
substantial accord with his authority ... The publication of this libel was madeby the agent, the executor.... if liability exists the principal should be responsible."
' Carver v. Morrow, 213 S. C. 199, 204, 48 S. E. 2d 814, 817 (1948). That this
is the prevalent doctrine in agency law can hardly be contested. RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY § 120 (1933).
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will at the behest of the testator." Indeed it is difficult to see that a
strict agency theory is necessary, for one who is the author of libelous
material and places it in such circumstances that publication will neces-
sarily result, is liable for the eventual publication."0 Thus there will
be publication of the libel in the will, not only by filing the will for pro-
bate, but also during the probate proceedings, and after probate when
the will is on file as a public record. "No more effective means of pub-
lishing and perpetuating a libel can be conceived than to secure the
inscription of such matter in court records, as by probate of a will.""1
When one executes a will he does so with the knowledge and expectation
that such will is to be published after his death; this is the natural course
of events, and at any rate it is probably the common law duty of one in
possession of a will to file it with the proper court after the death of the
testator.12 Further, many states by statute have made provisions to
force one having possession of a will to present the same for probate.' 3
The better reasoning would therefore seem to be that the testator, and
not the person who physically publishes the will, is the party responsible
for the publication.
Having established that there was no agency, the court in the instant
case then reasoned that the executor "is not an officer or agent of the
court until he is appointed and letters testamentary issued to him" ;14
therefore, there is a "hiatus between the testator's death and the court
appointment of the executor," and when the executor "or the custodian
of the will, files the same with the clerk, he is not acting for the court
but necessarily for the deceased. . . ." In this manner the court com-
Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686, 689 (Ore. 1954).
1" Some examples are: (1) sending libelous matter to a blind person, Lane v.
Schilling, 130 Ore. 119, 279 Pac. 267 (1929) ; (2) sending letter to fourteen-year-
old boy accusing him of theft, Hedgepeth v. Coleman, 183 N. C. 309, 111 S. E. 517(1922) ; (3) sending libelous matter with good reason to believe that it -will be
opened by authorized person other than addressee, Riley v. Askin and Marine Co.,
134 S. C. 198, 132 S. E. 584 (1926) ; (4) sending letter to known illiterate, Wilcox
v. Moon, 64 Vt. 450, 24 Atl. 244 (1892) ; Allen v. Worthan, 89 Ky. 485, 13 S. W.
73 (1890).
" Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 578, 162 S. E. 584, 585 (1913).122 PAGE, WILLS § 585 (3rd ed. 1941).
1" E.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-15 (1950). See also 2 PAGE, WILLS § 586 (3rd ed.
1941).
" Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686, 688 (Ore. 1954); Cf. Lindley v.
United States, 59 F. 2d 336 (9th Cir. 1932) ; Fistel v. Beaver Trust Co., 94 F.
Supp. 974 (S. D. N. Y. 1950) ; In re Estate of Doefler, 348 IIl. App. 347, 109 N. E.
230 (1952) ; Davenport v. Sandeman, 204 Iowa 927, 216 N. W. 55 (1927) ; In re
Ballard's Estate, 362 Mo. 1150, 247 S. W. 2d 683 (1952) ; In re Garris's Estate,
46 A. 2d 76 (Orphan's Ct. N. J. 1946) ; Dodd v. Anderson, 179 N. Y. 466, 90 N. E.
1137 (1910). But at common law the executor derived his authority from the will
and did not have to wait for probate. Grant v. Spann, 34 Miss. 294 (1857) ; State
v. Tazewell, 132 Ore. 122, 283 Pac. 745 (1930). See Harris v. Citizens' Bank and
Trust Co., 172 Va. 111, 200 S. E. 652 (1939).
15 Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686, 688 (Ore. 1954). It would also
appear to this writer that there should be ample opportunity for a libelous publica-
tion other than by the filing of the will for probate, since it seems quite likely that
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pletely renders irrelevant the matter of whether the probate was a plead-
ing in a court action and therefore privileged.
The instant case held that the publication "is not privileged because
publication antedates the probation.' 6  If, however, it is held that the
mere filing of the will with the probate court is a part of the judicial
proceeding, then the question of privilege becomes a much more difficult
problem, for when this reasoning is used the publication is frequently
held to be privileged on the ground that it is much the same as a party's
pleading in a civil action.17 One answer to such an argument is that,
even though this may be a pleading, it is not privileged because the in-
jured party cannot answer in a statement that will be included in the
record.18 It should be noted that the matter must be relevant for this
privilege to apply.' 9
One method of providing a partial answer to the problem has been
to allow the petitioner for probate to call possible libelous passages to
the court's attention and to petition for their omission from the will.
This procedure has been allowed in a few New York and English cases
where the matter omitted from the will was not material to the disposi-
tion of the property.20  Such a procedure is of questionable value,21 for
someone other than the libeled party will read the will prior to the probate thereof
and such communication, even to one person, would constitute publication. Simms
v. Clark, 194 So. 123 (La. Ct. App. 1946) ; Josa v. Maroney, 125 La. 813, 51 So.
908 (1910) ; Hedgepeth v. Coleman, 183 N. C. 309, 111 S. E. 517 (1922) ; Ostrowe
v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 175 N. E. 505 (1931) ; Bradley v. Conners, 169 Misc. 442, 7
N . Y. S. 2d 294 (Sup. Ct. 1938). See Mims v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200
F. 2d 800 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 345 U. S. 940 (1953).
" Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686, 689 (Ore. 1954).
1 It has been held that the filing of a will for probate is clearly analogous to a
plaintiff's pleading in a civil action in that it is the beginning of a judicial pro-
ceeding. "We believe that the rule which makes the pleading in a judicial proceed-
ing absolutely privileged may properly be applied to a will in which there is no
apparent purpose to injure the reputation of any one but merely a purpose to insure
distribution of the testator's estate to his intended beneficiaries and to protect it
from possible claims of persons whom he does not desire to share in the distribu-
tion." Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 510, 175 Atl. 487, 488 (1934).
"' In re Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733, 737 (Orphan's Ct. 1900). It would
appear that the view of the Gallagher case is not without merit, but the value of
this particular part of the opinion as a precedent is doubtful, for the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held that such a filing is part of the judicial proceeding and
is privileged. Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 At. 487 (1934). However, a
lower court of New York seems to approve of the language used in the Gallagher
case. Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
"0 North Carolina has held that pleadings are privileged when pertinent and
relevant even if false and malicious, but where the defamatory matter is not rele-
vant the party is stripped of the privilege. Harshaw v. Harshaw, 220 N. C. 145,
16 S. E. 2d 666 (1941). This view is also adopted in Scott v. Statesville Plywood
and Veneer Co., 240 N. C. 73, 81 S. E. 2d 146 (1954) ; PRossm, ToRTs § 94 (1941).
See also Note 48 HARV. L. REv. 1027, 1028 (1935) for a discussion in which the
writer concludes: "although redress should be allowed where libelous material is
irrelevant and engendered by malice, recovery should be limited to compensatory
damages since it is the estate rather than the guilty testator which must suffer."
"0 It re Draske's Will, 160 Misc. 587, 290 N. Y. S. 581 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; In re
Payne's Estate, 160 Misc. 224, 290 N. Y. S. 407 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; It re Speiden's
Estate, 128 Misc. 899, 221 N. Y. S. 223 (Surr. Ct. 1926) ; In re Bomar's Will, 27
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a publication occurs between the time the will is offered for probate and
the decision is reached as to what portions should be omitted. There-
fore, the harm is done even though the libelous portions are stricken from
the will.22 Where the libelous material is omitted, the determination of
what is actually dispositive must be liberally made in order to guard
against the omission of possible explanations as to the reasons for the
disposition of the property. The omitted matter may prove to be of
value if the will is contested. 23
There does not seem to be a North Carolina case dealing with libel
by will. This naturally poses the question as to what action the North
Carolina courts will take when faced with this situation. North Carolina
General Statute § 28-175 provides in part: "The following rights of
action do not survive: 1. Causes of action for libel and slander." It
would seem that the same reasoning would apply to this statute as the
courts have applied to the common law maxim that a personal right of
action dies with the person, and that it should be held that the statute
does not apply to the fact situation that exists in the principal case. 24
However, this would still leave the court free to decide the case either
for or against allowing the action to be brought, and a combination of
the reasons given in the decided cases could be used to allow or deny
recovery. It would seem that even if the court ignored the fact that the
libeled party may not answer and considered the probate of the will as
a pleading in a civil case (and consequently privileged) there would still
Abb. N. C. 425, 44 N. Y. S. R. 304, 18 N. Y. S. 214 (Ct. Com. P1. 1892) ; In the
Estate of Caie, 43 T. L. R. 697 (1927) ; Marsh v. Marsh, 1 Swa. and Tr. 528, 164
Eng. Rep. 845 (1860).21 This conclusion is contrary to the conclusion reached by the author of a
note in 10 N. C. L. RaV. 88, 90 (1931), which was written on the case of Hendricks
v. Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank, 43 Ga. App. 408, 158 S. E. 915 (1931), reed,
Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313 (1933).
There the author states: "In view of the American holdings it seems desirable for
the legislature to give to the probate court authority to expunge from a will libelous
matter which is not strictly dispositive."
2 See Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910, 922 (Sup. Ct. 1945)
where the court discusses the probable value of a petition for expungement at the
time the will was presented for probate and concludes that even if the matter were
expunged there would only have been "a reduction in the extent of the publication
of the libel; it would not have prevented the publication." See also 4 PAGE, WILLS
§ 1768 (3d ed. 1941).
2 But in some cases the expungement is from the probate copies only, and it
would seem that some of the disadvantages of expungement are avoided in this man-
ner. In re Croker's Will, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 190 (Surr. Ct. 1951); In the Estate of
Heywood, [1916] P. 47; In the Estate of White, [1914] P. 153; In re Goods of
Wartuaby, 1 Rob. Ecc. 423, 163 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1846).
But see the following where expungement was denied on the grounds: (1) that
the testator's wishes as to publication must be allowed, Hagen v. Yates, 1 Dem.
584 (N. Y. Surr. 1893); (2) that the court did not have the authority to order
expungement, Curtis v. Curtis, 3 Add. Ecc. 33, 162 Eng. Rep. 33 (1825).
" One must keep in mind that a holding by the court that the party has a cause
of action does not settle the question, for the defendant still has the defense of




be cases, at least where the matter is clearly irrelevant, in which the
plaintiff should be allowed to prosecute his case. 25
The result reached in the principal case seems to be more in line
with modem concepts of justice than does the proposition that one may
defame his fellow man and escape liability for the act. It is true that
it is the heirs who must suffer because of his indiscretion, since the estate
must pay the judgment, but this fact alone will exert a strong influence
on the maker of a will and cause him to be a bit more careful of the
reputations of those who might survive him.26
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It is suggested that the legislature should amend the present statute so as to
specifically provide recovery for libelous material in a will, particularly where this
material is not relevant.
2' Some of the reasons advanced for allowing recovery are: that the testator
composed the" libel and selected a means of publication that was almost certain to
attain the desired results, Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (Sup.
Ct. 1945); the alleged libel is written with premeditation and the writer intends
to escape liability by a publication of the item when he will not be subject to an
action and further with the knowledge that the libel will be a part of a public
record to be a "perpetual reminder of the charge," In Matter of Gallagher's Estate,
10 Pa. Dist. 733, 736 (Orphan's Ct. 1901) ; "If relief be denied this plaintiff in this
suit, she is indeed in a bad plight. There is no other way in which she may vindi-
cate the virtue and integrity of her mother and establish for herself the position
in society which she is entitled to occupy. . . . It cannot be said that the law
affords no remedy for a wrong such as the one perpetuated by this testator."
Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 585, 162 S. W. 584, 587 (1913).
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